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V
Summary
Game theory seeks to describe the interaction of two or more actors with distinct objectives. 
This is achieved using a mathematical model known as a game. Virtually all game theory relies 
on either the extensive form or the normal form to represent the games being studied.
By drawing on the previously unrelated fields of game theory and graphical modelling, and by 
taking a new approach to the way in which a game is modelled, an alternative to the extensive 
and normal forms is developed: the belief influence diagram (BID). Starting from the basic 
definition of a game and using a new form of conditional belief called a prospective function, it 
is shown how the decision influence diagram can be adapted to model games.
The advantages of the BID over the extensive and normal forms are explored, particularly 
its ability to model some of the qualitative aspects of games and to model games of greater 
complexity. By using BIDs in the modelling of games, fresh insight can be gained into certain 
features of the game, such as what sources of information an actor in the game should take 
account of.
New concepts of sufficiency and parsimony are defined which relate to the BID. It is shown 
how these concepts, when combined with different forms of rationality, can lead to a variety of 
methods for simplifying a BID, and hence simplifying the game which it represents. It is shown 
that such simplifications arc invariant with respect to the order in which the simplifying steps 
are carried out.
A schematic version of the BID is used to model finite repeated games and to develop concepts 
of learning and local sufficiency. It is shown how BIDs can be used to facilitate an induction 
proof in a finite repeated game and to model a highly complex competitive market. This last 
example is used to illustrate how BIDs can be helpful in evaluating some qualitative aspects of 
a model.
1 Introduction
Game theory seeks to describe the interaction of two or more actors with distinct objectives. 
This is achieved using a mathematical model known as a game. Since the theory of games 
depends to a great extent on the form taken by those models, a new approach to modelling 
implies a new approach to game theory itself.
Game theory is dominated by the use of two types of model: the game tree, or extensive 
form, and the payoff matrix, or normal form. Virtually all game theory relies on these forms, 
or variants thereof, to represent the games being studied.
By drawing on the previously unrelated fields of game theory and graphical modelling, and 
by taking a new approach to the way in which a game is modelled, we develop an alternative 
to the extensive and normal forms: the belief influence diagram (BID). We demonstrate some 
of the advantages of the BID over the extensive and normal forms, particularly its ability to 
model some of the qualitative aspects of games and to model games of greater complexity. We 
show how various assumptions about the rationality of actors can allow us to simplify the BID.
We take the view that a model of a game must capture the perceptions of the actors playing 
that game. Therefore our theory is based on the personal beliefs of those actors, and thus is 
subjective in nature. However, the theory is not ‘Bayesian’ as such, since another intention is 
to make the theory as general as possible. In fact, the model which we derive can be formulated 
to fit any subjective framework, including the ‘Bayesian’, as a special case.
Chapter 2 is a general survey of the game theory literature, and maps out the development 
of some of the more important ideas, as well as some of the paradoxes and problems with the 
theory. Chapter 3 looks at the literature on graphical modelling, giving an overview of the 
various types of graphical model, and concentrating on the use of the influence diagram in 
decision theory.
In chapter 4, we start from the foundations of game theory and devise step by step a new 
modelling framework for games. We describe a form of conditional belief known as a prospective 
function, from which arises a new version of conditional independence, called belief conditional 
independence. The belief influence diagram is defined according to the properties of belief 
conditional independence.
In chapter 5, we consider in detail the forms of rationality which an actor may adopt. We
I
derive a theory of sufficiency as it applies to the BID. This is linked to the rationality of actors 
through a principle of parsimony. In chapter 6, we show how various forms of rationality may 
allow us to simplify the BID (and hence the game itself) by deleting certain nodes and arcs. 
We prove that the simplification of a BID is invariant with respect to the order in which these 
deletions take place. We also consider the implications which rationality has for the principles 
of modelling a game.
In chapter 7, we take a look at finite repeated games, and use their special structure to 
generate the ideas of local sufficiency and local optimality. We consider a definition of learning 
in repeated games, and demonstrate how the ideas of the previous chapters can be applied. 
We show how BIDs can assist in proving a general theorem about finite repeated games using 
induction. As an example, we demonstrate how a highly complex competitive market may 
be modelled using BIDs, and consider briefly how BIDs can be helpful in evaluating some 
qualitative aspects of a model.
In chapter 8, we present our conclusions, and some suggestions for further research on the 
theory of games developed in this thesis.
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2 A Brief History of Game Theory
2.1 Foundations
Game theory seeks to describe the interaction of two or more actors with distinct objectives. 
This is achieved using a mathematical model known as a game.
2.1.1 T he orig ins o f gam e theory
The earliest examples of such mathematical models occurred in economics, most notably in the 
theory of oligopoly, as developed by Cournot in the 19th century.
The first to regard games as models to be studied in their own right was Borel (1921). He 
considered the concepts of pure and mixed strategies as they apply to what are now known 
as normal form games. However similar ideas were independently pursued by von Neumann 
in the 20’s and 30’s, and it was the publication in 1944 of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
"Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour” which established game theory as a recognised 
field of academic study.
This remarkable work contained many of the ideas which would be employed by game 
theorists in future years, including an axiomatic definition of a game, derivation of extensive 
and normal forms, pure and mixed strategies and the minimax theorem. It also predicted many 
of the areas where advances would be made. Indeed all subsequent work on game theory can 
be traced back to it.
2.1.2 T he ex tensive  form
The version of the extensive form which is used today is due to Kuhn (1953). The extensive 
form  of a game consists of a tree wherein each non-terminal node represents an action to be 
taken by one of the actors, and each arc out of a node represents one of the possible acts 
available to that actor. Chance actions can be represented by designating one of the actors as 
‘nature’ and including her actions in the same way. Each terminal node represents the outcome 
resulting from the sequence of acts represented by the path from the origin.
Associated with each outcome is a utility vector or value. Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944) defined an actor's utility according to axioms of expected utility using frcquentist prob­
abilities. This was generalised to include subjective probabilities by Savage (1954) for decision
theory and by Luce and Raiffa (1957) in the case of game theory.
In a game of perfect information every actor knows the complete history of the game when­
ever he takes an action. In the case of imperfect information an actor may be uncertain as to 
which of two or more nodes represents the action he is about to take. A set of nodes between 
which an actor is uncertain as to which represents his action is said to form an information set. 
If an information set contains two or more nodes, they are connected by a dotted line in the 
extensive form.
Figure 2.1. The Extensive Form of a Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Thus in the game depicted in Figure 2.1, actor Il| chooses whether to co-operate (C) or 
defect (D). In ignorance of I ll’s act, Ilj faces the same choice. The game shown here is known 
as a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG), as first described by A.W. Tucker.
2.1.3 S tra teg ies and th e  norm al form
Clearly as the number of moves by each actor increases, the extensive form will become unman­
ageably large. An alternative method of describing a game is to consider the strategies of each 
actor. A (purr) strategy for an actor consists of a sequence of acts, one for each information set 
at which he may have to take an action. Thus it represents a complete specification of how he 
will play a game whatever is done by the other player(s).
So instead of an actor choosing an act whenever one of his information sets is reached, 
he could simply choose one strategy. If every actor does this, it determines the outcome and 
value of the game. The normal form of a game with n actors II i . . . . .  n n is an n-dimensional
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matrix in which a plane perpendicular to the i-th dimension corresponds to a strategy of n< 
and each element is the value associated with the relevant outcome. It is usual to marginalise 
out any chance actions by taking expectations of the value over the appropriate probability 
distributions.
Thus the normal form for the game shown in Figure 2.1 is:
n,
c D
3
3
1
4
4
1
2
2
Figure 2.2. The Normal Form of a PDG
Compared with the extensive form, the normal form is particularly convenient for games 
with two actors and imperfect information, such as PDGs.
2.2 Equilibrium  Theory
Much of game theory over the years has been concerned with advising actors on how they ought 
to play certain games. And right from the start, most authors have focussed on equilibrium as 
a key concept. An rqutltbnum in a game is a set of strategies, one for each actor, such that 
each strategy is an optimal response to the set of strategies played by the other actors.
Let us consider some of the reasons why equilibrium has assumed such an important role 
in game theory. The first is that the primary motivation for game theory arose initially out 
of some problems in economics, in which equilibrium was already a familiar idea. Also the 
earliest games to be studied in detail were predominantly two-actor sero-sum games, for which 
equilibrium is the most natural and justifiable outcome. Then there is the widely held belief 
that game theory should inform not just one actor in a game, but all actors, simultaneously. 
In other words, all actors should be told how to play the game optimally. It is clear that in
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order for such a theory to be self-consistent, the set of proposed optimal strategies must form 
an equilibrium.
2.2.X N ash equilib rium
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) focussed on zero-sum two person games. In the case 
of perfect information, Zermelo’s Theorem (Zermelo 1912) shows that an equilibrium exists 
in pure strategies, and can be constructed from the extensive form via backwards induction. 
In the case of imperfect information, the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies is not 
guaranteed, so mixed strategies are required.
A mixed strategy for an actor is a probability distribution over his set of pure strategies. 
Von Neumann's Minimax Theorem showed that all zero-sum 2-person games (of complete in­
formation) have an equilibrium in mixed strategies. This result was extended by Nash (1951) 
who proved that all finite n-person games of complete information contained at least one equi­
librium, or Nash Equilibrium, as it would from then on be known. In fact, as is shown by 
Aumann and Brandenburger (1991), weaker conditions than complete information will suffice 
to guarantee a Nash Equilibrium.
2.2.2 Problem * w ith  m ixed strateg ies
The use of mixed strategies is by no means uncontroversial. For a start, suppose the expected 
utility to an actor resulting from a unique equilibrium (in mixed strategies) is v. There are 
some instances where v can be guaranteed as a minimum by adopting one pure strategy but 
not another, even when the second is played with positive probahility according to the mixed 
strategy. This was noted, among others, by liarsanyi (1964) who suggested that an actor 
faced with such a situation should not play such a mixed strategy. This result was extended 
by Aumann and Maschler (1972) who cast doubt on the validity of Minimax even in certain 
zero-sum games.
However there is a more fundamental objection to the use of mixed strategies, voiced by 
many over the years, namely whether it makes sense to play them at all. According to early 
(frequentist) definitions, a mixed strategy would result from the actor concerned carrying out 
in private some experiment for which the outcomes had known probabilities corresponding to 
those specified by the strategy, and then playing the pure strategy determined by the outcome
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of the experiment. Such a mechanism was seen to be inherently unsatisfactory by many, includ­
ing Howard (1971) who questioned whether a ‘rational’ person would ever base an important 
decision on, for example, the toss of a coin.
To justify the concept of mixed strategies, it is necessary to consider the original motivation 
as advanced by Borel (1921) that an actor’s strategy, if it became known to his opponent, would 
allow her in certain situations to take advantage of this knowledge, whereas a mixed strategy 
would keep her guessing. Thus it can be seen that the essence of a mixed strategy lies not in 
the explicit randomisation of play, but in the (subjective) uncertainty of an actor’s opponents 
as to which pure strategy he is playing, as pointed out by (for example) Aumann (1987) and 
Binmore (1988).
The question then arises as to what happens in games with three or more actors, in which 
more than one actor has some uncertainty. The usual way of handling this is to impose the 
condition that the uncertainty is expressed in terms of a commonly held belief on the part of an 
actor’s opponents. Such an interpretation is advanced by Rubinstein (1991) and Brandenburger 
(1992). Some of the consequences of relaxing this condition are explored by Aumann (1974).
2.2.3 R efinem ents o f Nash equilibrium
For the last forty years Nash Equilibrium (N.E.) has been the dominant idea in game theory. 
One measure of i t ’s success is the sheer volume of suggested alterations, by the tightening or 
relaxing of conditions, or the imposition of new conditions. To many, the principal difficulty 
with N.E. is that in general it is not unique. Thus it does not always provide a definitive answer 
to the question posed by a person playing the game: “How should I play?” . Hence much effort 
has been expended in weeding out certain types of N.E. as being unsatisfactory, for one reason 
or another, in an attem pt to see if a ‘best’ equilibrium or set of equilibria can be found.
Much of the disagreement on which criteria should be used to discriminate between alterna­
tive equilibria has centered on the argument over which of the normal form and extensive form 
is the more fundamental. Selten (1975) employs the extensive form to motivate his subgame 
perfect equilibrium concept. Using the idea of a “trembling hand" which induces small mistakes 
(ie. deviations from equilibrium strategy), he considers which N.E.s are self enforcing in the 
limit ns the probability of mistakes tends to zero.
Kreps and Wilson (1982) define the almost identical concept of sequential equilibrium by
7
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considering explicitly the beliefs of actors who find themselves at a point in the extensive form 
which is off the equilibrium path. They argue that every act taken must be part of an optimal 
strategy for the remainder of the game. Myerson’s (1978) proper equilibrium is related to perfect 
equilibrium, but demands in addition that the probability of a mistake be monotone decreasing 
in relation to the cost of the mistake. One problem with this is that the axiom of independence 
of irrelevant alternatives may be violated, as was noted by Jurada and Sanchez (1990).
On the other side, Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) argue that equilibria based on the extensive 
form may not be invariant under certain innessential transformations (for example the addition 
of a trivial action). They claim that the set of self-enforcing, or strategically stable equilibria 
should depend only on a ‘reduced normal form’ (derived by considering only equivalence classes 
of mixed strategies). A related concept is persistent equilibrium, as described by Kalai and 
Samet (1984).
Perhaps the most extreme example of equilibrium refinement is the tracing procedure of 
liarsanyi and Selten (1988). They argue that the use by an actor of a N.E. strategy cannot be 
justified unless it is unique or he knows all the other actors will choose strategics corresponding 
to the same equilibrium. They therefore devise a method for recommending a single equilibrium 
for any game, based on perfectness, payoff-dominance, risk-dominance and symmetry. They 
base their analysis on what they call the “standard form” of a game, which combines elements 
of both the normal and extensive forms.
2.2.4 A lte rn a tiv e s  to  Nash equilibrium
While attem pts to reduce the number of equilibria have predominated, some authors have 
suggested that Nash Equilibrium is too narrow as a solution concept. For the outcome of a 
game to form a N.E. relies implicitly in many cases on all the actors believing that it will 
occur, prior to taking their actions (or choosing their strategies). Yet it can be argued that this 
assumption is under many circumstances unreasonable. Indeed, in a game where there is more 
than one N.E., the outcome may not be a N.E. despite all actors choosing a N.E. strategy.
Consider the normal form game shown in Figure 2.3, commonly called the “Battle of the 
Sexes” .
In this game there are two pure strategy equilibria (A;a) and (B\b) and a mixed strategy
8
n3
2
1
0
0
0
0 to
Figure 2.3. The Normal Form for “Battle of the Sexes”
equilibrium ( \A ,  ja , 56), with respective values (2,1), (1,2) and (§ ,§). Now suppose we 
alter the game so that both actors observe the outcome of some random device, say tossing a 
fair coin. Then the strategies (A; a) if heads, (B; 6) if tails form a new equilibrium with value 
( j ,  | ). Note that this equilibrium pareto-dominates the old mixed strategy equilibrium, that is 
it results in a higher utility for both actors.
This is an example of a correlated equilibrium, as defined by Aumann (1974). In Aumann 
(1987), he shows that under certain assumptions, a normal form game played by “rational 
Bayesians” will always result in such an equilibrium. Note that the set of correlated equilibria 
includes as special cases all Nash equilibria.
A quite different approach is taken by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984), who contend 
that it is not just Nash Equilibrium but the concept of equilibrium itself which is too restrictive. 
They concentrate instead on the types of strategies which “rational” actors might reasonably 
play, using the idea of iterated dominance.
A strategy is said to dominate another if it results in a higher utility for the actor concerned 
whatever the other actors do. This is equivalent to the “Sure-thing” principle of Savage (1954). 
Playing a dominated strategy is ruled out under all the equilibrium concepts discussed so far.
Assuming that no actor will ever play a dominated strategy, the corresponding rows or 
columns in the normal form can be ignored. This may lead to previously undominated strategies 
available to other actors becoming dominated. Thus it is reasonable to assume those will 
never be played. This process, known as iterated dominance, continues until only undominated 
strategies remain. These strategies are called rationaltzable by Bernheim and Pearce. Playing
of rationalizable strategies does not in general result in an equilibrium, although Brandenburger 
and Dekel (1987) give an interpretation of rationalizability which shows the connections with 
equilibrium and correlation.
2.3 T he R ole o f Inform ation
The information which an actor has when playing a game and the effects of that information 
have received increasing attention over the years. Among the most important features to 
be studied are common knowledge, learning in repeated games and the case of incomplete 
information.
2.3.1 C om m on knowledge
When playing a game of any complexity, an intelligent actor will usually ask himself the ques­
tion: “What do I know about my opponent(s)?” Of particular interest is the state of mind of 
an opponent, including the question: “What do my opponents know about me?” Such consid­
erations lead to statements of the kind: “I know that you know that he knows that she knows 
that . . . X ” , and so on ad infinitum. Roughly speaking, if all statements taking this form are 
true (for any finite sequence of actors with no two adjacent ones the same), then X  is said to 
be common knowledge.
Common knowledge is one of the main foundational concepts which underlies game theory. 
Indeed, before any analysis of a game can take place, the common knowledge base must be 
established. This will always include some definition of the ‘rules of the game’, even if this is 
simply the order in which actions are taken.
For example, all of the previous discussion implicitly uses common knowledge, such as 
common knowledge of the normal or extensive forms or of an actor being “rational”. Aumann 
(1976) wns the first to consider common knowledge in detail and give a formal definition, to 
which the following is equivalent.
D efinition 2.1 Lei 11* a  . . . ,  □(*)} £  II be a set of adore. Define A'(I1*) to be the
common knowledge set for II*. Then for any statement ‘X
•X ’e  K(U k ) <=> TI(0 knows X ’e  A'(I1*) for i = 1 , . . . ,* .
We say ‘X  ’ is common knowledge among the actors in II*.
10
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Milgrom (1981) provides an axiomatic characterisation of common knowledge. Branden- 
burger (1992) analyses the connections between common knowledge and various solution con­
cepts, Geanakoplos (1992) discusses the implications for certain problems outside game theory 
and Reny (1992) considers what happens when common knowledge breaks down. A good review 
can be found in Binmore and Brandenburger (1990).
2.3.2 P aradoxes o f ra tio n a lity
What does it mean for an actor to be “rational”? I suppose just about everyone would agree that 
it has something to do with utility maximisation. But beyond that, consensus breaks down. 
Consider the various solution concepts outlined above. Each, either explicitly or implicitly, 
relies for justification on some definition of rationality. Indeed, each must rely on a different 
definition, for how else could differing outcomes obtain?
A cynical interpretation might be that rationality is in some cases defined in terms of the 
solution concept, with Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) coming closest to admitting this 
by the use of the term “rationalizable” to describe their concept. Now if anyone is justified in 
laying claim to a general condition of rationality then they are, since they rely solely on iterated 
domination. Yet even domination turns out not to be such a “sure thing” as it appears.
Consider the PDG shown in Figures 2 and 3. The only equilibrium is (D ,d ), moreover 
D dominates C  and d dominates c. However, (C, c) pareto-dominates (D ,d ), a phenomenon 
which has caused more to be written about PDGs than most other games put together. This 
phenomenon becomes more interesting when two actors play a number of PDGs consecutively, 
known as a repeated game.
In both the one-off PDG and the finitely repeated PDG all the solution concepts above 
recommend the playing of (D ,d) at every stage. While this seems reasonable for a single 
PDG, many disagree when it comes to the repeated version. Howard (1971) uses the repeated 
PDG to illustrate his assertion that in general it is impossible for all actors to be what he 
calls “objectively rational” . He suggested that a person playing such a game should cooperate 
in order to induce his opponent to do likewise. Such an approach is in fact well-founded, 
considering that in experimental games people often do better by adopting such strategies than 
by continually defecting. For a comprehensive review of the experimental literature in game 
theory, see Colman (1982).
II
A similar phenomenon can occur even in games of perfect information. Examples include 
Selten’s (1978) “Chain-store Paradox", Rosenthal’s (1981) “centipede” , and the “Take it or 
leave it” game of Reny (1992). In each case, an actor can in some circumstances do better by 
rejecting the backward’s induction analysis implied by Zermelo’s theorem and adopting instead 
a form of “forward induction", involving inducement or (in the chain-store paradox) deterrence.
Such arguments tend to suggest that, while it is reasonable to suppose that rationality 
involves utility maximisation, there is in general no method of achieving this which can incon- 
trevertibly be called “rational” . Basu (1990) uses Rosenthal’s centipede to show that under 
certain reasonable axioms, any definition of rationality for extensive games leaves open the pos­
sibility of a contradiction: that an “irrational” move leads to a higher utility than a “rational” 
one.
Binmore (1987) uses such arguments to conclude that all rationality must be imperfect, or 
bounded. Bounded rationality involves an actor taking into account the cost of thinking about 
his choice of act, and the cost of thinking about the cost of thinking about his choice, and so 
on. Simon (1955) was the first to introduce the concept of bounded rationality. Alternative 
approaches are taken by Binmore (1988) and Lipman (1991).
2.3.3 Infin itely  rep ea ted  games
As we have already seen, playing a game a number of times in succession can lead to outcomes 
quite different from those which occur in a one-shot game. Formally, a repeated game comprises 
a number of consecutive plays of a game, known as the ntage game or generating game, by 
the same actors. The utility to an actor of the repeated game is a monotone non-decreasing 
function of the utility from each stage game. It is usually assumed that this takes the form 
of the sum of utilities for finitely repeated games, and either the sum with discounting or the 
limiting mean in the infinite case, although this assumption is questionable.
As with one-shot and finitely repeated games, the study of infinitely repeated games has 
resulted in a number of different approaches. Perhaps the best known is the Folk theorem, 
so called because it arose from work by several authors. Shubik (1970) illustrated the result 
for the special case of the PDG, which he attributed to R.J. Aumann, the general case being 
developed by Rubinstein (1979) and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986).
Informally, the Folk Theorem states that under general circumstances, every feasible out-
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come which does not reward any actor less than his minimax utility, can arise as a Nash equi­
librium. The set of equilibria satisfying these conditions is in general uncountable — quite a 
contrast from the single equilibrium result of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Figure 2.4 illustrates 
the set of equilibria for the infinitely repeated PDG.
0  ------ - ----- - ----- 1------ -------
0 1 2  3 4
Figure 2.4. The Core of the Infinitely Repeated PDG
Other approaches to infinitely repeated games are taken by Howard (1971) and Grofman 
and Pool (1975). Fudenberg and Levine (1990) examine the case where an actor plays a stage 
game against a sequence of different opponents. Hart (1985) characterises the equilibria of 
nonzero sum two person repeated games, under conditions of incomplete information, to which 
topic we now turn.
2.3.4 Incom ple te  in form ation
So far we have taken for granted that the basic structure of the game, including the acts or 
strategics available to any actor and the value resulting from every outcome, are known to 
all actors, indeed are common knowledge. This condition characterises games with complete 
information; a game which does not satisfy this condition is said to have incomplete information. 
For the most part such games were left alone by the early classical game theorists, yet they 
represent an important class of games, in so far as a game intended to model accurately a real 
life situation is likely to include elements of incomplete information.
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The lack of common knowledge of certain aspects of a game leads to an infinite regress; each 
actor must explicitly consider his beliefs about his opponent, his beliefs about his opponent’s 
beliefs about him, and so on, in an infinite hierarchy of beliefs. The first to tackle this problem 
in a systematic way was Harsanyi (1967). He modelled a game of incomplete information as 
having resulted from a prior distribution which was common knowledge. Each actor’s utility 
and information is considered to be the result of a lottery distributed according to this common 
prior distribution. Thus a game with incomplete information can be converted to a “Bayesian 
game” with complete (but imperfect) information which is tractable. Mertens and Zamir (1985) 
give a mathematical formulation of this.
Harsanyi (1968a) justifies the common prior assumption (now know as the “Harsanyi doc­
trine” ) by claiming that all differences between actors can at some level be explained entirely 
by differences in experience or information. His analysis has been utilised by many, includ­
ing Aumann (1987). However it has many critics (see for example Binmore (1991) and Gul 
(1991b)).
An alternative approach to a game of incomplete information (and in the case of some 
authors, to a game of complete information) is to represent it as a decision problem from the 
point of view of each individual actor. The analysis then follows along the lines proposed by 
Savage (1954). The actor evaluates his prior distribution for every unknown element of the 
game, including the nature of his opponents. He then acts so as to maximise his utility subject 
to these beliefs, updating them as the game progresses according to the standard Bayesian 
analysis. Advocates of this subjective Bayesian approach include Kadane and Larkey (1982, 
1983), Tan and Werlang (1988) and Rosenthal (1981).
The approach based on solution concepts is criticised (by Kadane and Larkey (1982) and 
Binmore (1987) among others) for assuming too much: that it is common knowledge that all 
actors are rational. The subjectivist approach is criticised (by Harsanyi (1982) and Binmore 
(1991)) for assuming too little: that there are no restrictions on what beliefs an actor may 
adopt. The consequences of some possible exogenous restrictions on beliefs are discussed in 
Gul (1991a) and Brandenburger (1992).
This represents one of the most fundamental disagreements in game theory, although there 
have been attempts (see for example Nau 1992) to reconcile the two approaches. For the record, 
I would recommend a pragmatic approach. When playing a game one has at some point to make
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a decision, and in that sense an actor should base any decision on his (subjective) evaluation 
of the situation. Such an evaluation should however be informed by theory relevant to the 
behaviour of actors in a game, which may well include the implications of solution concepts.
2.4 Back to  Basics
Underlying this disagreement is the distinction between normative or prescriptive theory which 
sets out what “rational” actors should do, and positive (descriptive, predictive) theory which 
attempts to describe what actually happens. Most of the non-experimental game theory liter­
ature, such as is discussed above, concerns the former, Howard (1971) being one exception.
It is claimed by Kadane and Larkey (1983) that one of the major problems with game 
theory is that the two types of theory are so often confused. One of the consequences is that 
a normative theory which attempts to advise all actors in a game (in other words a solution 
concept) bases its advice to each actor on the assumption that every other actor plays the 
game in a way which is recommended by the theory. Hence a normative theory depends on the 
positive theory that there is no difference between the normative and the positive.
This might not be such a terrible problem were it not for the diversity of normative theories, 
none of which has been able consistently to predict how people will play a game. It seems the 
only way in which this might occur is the adoption of a certain way of playing by substantial 
numbers of people as the result of the publication of a theory recommending it, and there is no 
real evidence that this has ever happened.
Yet there is an even more fundamental objection to the solution concept approach. This 
relates to the way in which games are modelled. Now there are two possible ways in which a 
situation of conflict can be analysed using a mathematical model. The first is to include every 
essential aspect of the situation in the model. Then the model can be analysed as if it were the 
real-life situation, and provided the model is reasonably accurate any result obtained should be 
directly relevant to the situation.
The second is to summarise the situation by incorporating into the model a relatively small 
amount of information. The analysis of such a mathematical model will not in itself suggest 
a course of action, but may be used constructively, by considering the results in the context 
of the real life situation. Now the first approach is difficult, since most models would quickly
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become far too complicated to be analysed. The second is in some sense unsatisfactory because 
it does not provide any definite answer.
So solution concepts cleverly sidestep this problem by using only a simple game model, 
and then analysing it as if it were in fact the real life situation. Binmore (1987, 1988, 1991) 
makes much the same criticism. He suggests as an alternative the use of an imperfectly rational 
decision criterion, which recommends a “best guess” if an optimal solution has not been within 
a fixed period of time.
Given these fundamental problems with the modelling of games, and given that the relative 
primacy of the normal and extensive forms is at best undecided, we must surely conclude that 
there is room at least to consider alternative models. Any rival to these long-established models 
must demonstrate an advantage in some of those areas in which they are deficient. One area 
of deficiency common to both is the problem of modelling anything other than the simplest 
of situations. One possible way of overcoming this deficiency is by using an influence diagram 
instead of a tree as the basis of our model. This is the approach I propose to take.
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3 An Introduction to Graphical Modelling
3.1 T he E lem ents
The modern theory of graphical models was formed by the fusion of two ideas: descriptive 
models based on the concept of causality and the statistical theory of conditional independence.
3.1.1 E arly  causal m odels
The year 1921, when Borel published his ideas on game theory, also saw the first developments 
in the theory of graphical modelling. The concept of path analysis was introduced to statistics 
by the geneticist Wright (1921). It was based on the construction of a qualitative diagram, 
called a path diagram in which the variables were linked by directed arcs indicating causality 
and correlation.
In figure 3.1, the random variable Vo has directed edges from the causal variables V\ , Vj 
and Vs. They, in turn, are linked to each other by double-headed arrows to signify unknown 
degrees of correlation between them.
The path analysis rules of Wright (1921, 1934) provided a method of measuring influence
by a particular cause. This method was limited to the analysis of linear relations between 
continuous random variables.
Path diagrams and other related models have found many uses. Apart from work on mea­
suring correlation and causality (see Kiiveri et al, 1984, for a review of the early work in this
Figure 3.1. An Early Path Diagram
along each path in the diagram, and of finding the degree to which an effect was determined
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area), a variety of causal models have been employed in economics and the social sciences for 
both quantitative and qualitative analysis; see, for example, Blalock (1971).
However, for many years a general theory combining path analysis with probability calculus 
proved elusive, due it seems to the complicated nature of the possible relationships which could 
obtain between several variables. Goodman (1973), who analysed similar graphs involving dis­
crete variables, was one of the first to notice a link between the structure of a path diagram and 
the presence of conditional independence constraints on the distribution of the random vari­
ables. This, when combined with Dawid’s (1979) axiomatisation of conditional independence, 
provided the necessary analytic tool to put graphical models on to a firm mathematical footing.
3.1.2 C ond itiona l independence
Probabilistic conditional independence, or conditional independence (c.i.), is a relationship 
• i± p  |- defined over three random vectors, or sets of random vectors.
D efin ition  3.1 Lei Q be a set of random vectors, and let X ,Y ,Z C Q . Then we interpret the 
relation X  lL p Y \Z  to mean: “X  is (probabilistic) conditionally independent of Y , given Z. " 
or “Given Z, Y  is uninformative about X . ” In the case that X  it (unconditionally) independent 
o fY  we write: XUpV'IB , or just X  XLpY
Dawid (1979) demonstrated the importance of conditional independence in statistics, and 
derived several properties of probabilistic c.i. The most important of these are summarised 
(using a general conditional independence notation) by the properties C1-C3 below. These 
have since been adopted as the standard c.i. axioms by most researchers in the field, and are 
sometimes called the semt-graphotd axioms (Pearl and Verma 1987) or graphoid axioms (Geiger 
et al 1990).
For W ,X ,Y ,Z C Q ,
C l X ± L Y \Y U Z , .
C2 X 1 L Y \Z  <=> Y 1 L X IZ  .
C3 X 1 L Y U Z \W  <=> X 1 L Z \W  and X ± L Y \Z u W  .
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Other axioms proposed include the ‘intersection’ axiom,
C4 X 1 L Y \Z  and X  1 L Z \Y  =*• X l L Y U Z \ Y n Z  .
However this does not hold in general for probabilistic c.i., except under positivity or sim­
ilar constraints. It is also the case, according to Dawid (1993), that probabilistic c.i. cannot 
be characterised by a finite set of axioms (although C1-C3 appear to be adequate for most 
purposes).
Smith (1988) argued that C1-C3 ought to apply to systems which incorporate objects 
other than random vectors. He postulated that any sensible concept of relationship between 
variables should exhibit such a c.i. structure. He defines (Smith 1989b) generalised conditional 
independence to be any relation of the form • _LL|- which satisfies axioms C1-C3.
A number of versions of conditional independence as presented by Dawid (1993) are de­
scribed briefly below:
L inear C.I. (Smith 1990): Let Q be a linear space of variables, with covariance £ . Then 
X  l i t  y |2 (E )  if the coefficient of Y  in linear regression of X  on (V, Z) can be taken as 0 (or 
equivalently, X  and Y  have zero partial correlation with respect to Z).
C onditional V ariance Independence: Let S  be any subset of the sample space il. Then 
X  XLv Y\Z[S] if {X(u/) : w € S ,Y (u )  = y, Z(u) = *} depends only on z.
M eta-C .I.: Let V  be a parametrised family of distributions. Then X  1Lm Y\Z[P] if 
X  ±LpY\Z[0] for all 0 e  V  and 0(x.Z) -U-v 0(Y,Z)\Oz[V] , where 0(.) is the value of 0 which 
parametrises the (joint) marginal distribution over (•). Smith (1990) described a special case 
of meta-c.i., known as parametrised family c.i.
H yper-C .I.: Let II be a prior distribution for 0. Then X  1Lh Y\Z[\1] if X  J-L*/ Y\Z[P] and
0(X,Z) -LLpS(yiZ)|0z[n] .
IL-licf Function C.I. (Dempster-Shafer): Let S  be a random subset of fl, and S x  =  {^(w) : 
w e S } . Then X U-b. \Y \Z  if X  I l v  Y\Z[S\ f o ra l lS C ila n d  $ x z  n .p $ v z \$ z  ■
3.2 T ypes of Graphical M odel
We can now define various kinds of graphical model using conditional independence. Principally 
there are three types which have been used to represent relations of probabilistic c.i. between
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variables: the undirected graph, directed acyclic graph and chain graph.
3.2.1 U n d irec ted  graphs
We start with the simplest version, the undirected graph. The definition we use here is the 
same as that given by Lauritzen et al (1990).
D efin ition  3.2 Lei Q = Q \ , . . .  , Q n be a act of random vectors. Then an undirected graph Gq 
constats of the set nodes {(J, : Qi € Q} and a subset of the arcs { (Q i,Q > )  : Qi ,Q j  € Q ,i /  j ) ,  
consistent with the global Markov property:
For any subsets A, B ,C C Q ,
A ±LpB\C
if every path between a node in A and a node in C passes through a node in B.
Figure 3.2. An Undirected Graph
For instance the graph in figure 3.2 implies the c.i. relations
W 1L P Z \X ,Y  and X 1 L PY \W ,Z  .
Note, however, that the converse of the global Markov property is in general false, so that 
figure 3.2 does not deny, for example, the relation
W 1LPX \Y ,Z  .
Hence adding an arc to an undirected graph does not lead to any untrue implications — it 
merely reduces the amount of information in the graph.
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Furthermore, it should be noted that while sparser graphs (that is, graphs containing fewer 
arcs) are more informative given any set of c.i. constraints, there is in general no unique minimal 
graph, and not all sets of c.i. conditions can be represented both simultaneously and exclusively 
by an undirected graph. For example, the relation X  IL p Y  cannot be represented in an 
undirected graph Gq without implying X  ±LpY\Z  for every Z  G Q \(X  U Y ). As Simpson’s 
Paradox illustrates, this is in general false.
Further details on representing c.i. in undirected graphs may be found in Pearl et al (1989) 
and Whittaker (1990).
3.2.2 D irec ted  acyclic graphs
There appears to be some confusion in terminology in the literature on directed graphs, with 
some authors using the term ‘directed acyclic graph’ and some the term ‘influence diagram’ 
(some even use both) to define the same object. In this chapter 1 intend to follow the terminology 
used by Pearl (1988), namely that a graph representing only probabilistic (random) quantities 
will be called a directed acyclic graph, or DAG, and one which includes decisions and utilities 
will be called an influence diagram (ID).
The development of DAGs was largely inspired by the work of Pearl (1986) on propagation 
within probabilistic networks and the earlier work of Kiiveri et al (1984). While a DAG looks 
much the same as an undirected graph, excepting that the arcs have arrows on them, there is 
a subtle difference in the way it is defined and interpreted. We begin with some notation for 
use in directed graphs.
Consider a graph on the set of objects Q. Let Qi , Qj  €  Q
An(Qj) := {Qj G Q : There exists a directed path y(Qj,Q/)} is the ancestor set of Qj.
De(Qj) := {Q< G Q : There exists a directed path 7 (Qj  , Qj)} is the descendent set of Qj.
Pa (Qj)  := G Q : There exists a directed arc (Qj,Qj)} is the parent set of Qj.
Of(Qj) := {Qj G Q : There exists a directed arc ( Qj . Qj)} ¡a the offspring set of Qj.
So, for instance, in figure 3.3, An(Z) = {W, X ,V ).
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Figure 3.3. A Directed Acyclic Graph
D efin ition  3.3 Lei Q  = Q \ , . . . , Q n be a set of random vectors. Then a directed acyclic 
graph, or DAG Hq consists of the set of nodes {Q, : Q, € <?} and a subset of the directed arcs 
{ (Q i 'Q j )  ■ Qi ,Qj  € < ? , « '#  j] ,  such that for all Qi  €  Q,
(i) Qi  An (Qi), in other words, Hq has no cycles, and 
(») Q . H p Q V Q .  U D e ig jJ I P a fQ . )  .
The standard definition of a DAG involves specifying an ordering (or at least a partial 
ordering) of Q,  and defining each successive random vector in the ordering as an offspring of 
some subset of the preceding random vectors. Indeed, this is how a DAG is often constructed; 
see, for example, Smith (1989b). However, the above definition is equivalent since, without loss 
of generality, we may assume that Qi 6 An(Qj)  only if i < j.
3.2.3 T h e  d -soparation  theo rem
We defined the undirected graph using the global Markov property, which allows us immediately 
to read off all c.i. statements implied by the graph, simply by using the separation criterion. 
The DAG, in contrast is defined much more sparsely (in terms of as few as n — 1 c.i. statements, 
to be precise). Yet the number of possible c.i. constraints between n variables is (j)2 n _ i, most 
of which do not involve conditioning on parental variables, as in the defining conditions.
Fortunately, there is a method of determining which c.i. statements are implied by a DAG, 
known as d-separation. This first appeared in Pearl and Verma (1987), and was proved by 
Verma (1988). Geiger and Pearl (1988) proved the closure of the DAG representation of condi-
tional independence, in the sense that the c.i. conditions implied by a DAG are exactly those 
the verity of which can be derived using d-separation.
The version of d-separation we use here is due to Lauritzen et al (1990). It uses a process 
of moralisation, as described by Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter (1988), to form an undirected 
subgraph of the original DAG, which is then consistent with the global Markov property.
T heorem  3.1 (d -S epara tion ) Suppose that conditional independence statements for a set of 
random vectors Q are represented in a DAG H , and that A, B ,C C Q  denote subsets of random 
vectors on it. Adapt the DAG in the following way:
(i) Form the directed subgraph H\ of H whose nodes consist of the ancestor set A U B U C  U 
An(A U B U C ) and whose directed arcs are those in H which lie between these nodes.
(ii) For all Z  G I\, join all unconnected pairs of nodes (X ,Y )  G Pa(Z) by an undirected arc. 
This process is known as moralising the graph since all parents of a single node are jotned by 
an arc. Call this mixed graph Hi.
(iti) Form an undirected graph I by replacing all directed arcs in Hi by undirected arcs.
Then,
A ±LpB\C
if  all undirected paths in /  between a node R  € A and a node S  G B must pass through a node
T e c .
An example of the deduction of a c.i. statement via d-separation is illustrated in figure 3.4. 
As with the undirected graph, the DAG has its limitations; it is not always possible to 
represent a set of c.i. statements faithfully in a single DAG, even if it is representable in an 
undirected graph. For example, the two c.i. conditions W ± L p Z \X ,Y  and X lL p Y \W ,Z  
illustrated in figure 3.2 cannot be simultaneously implied by a single DAG. The work of Studeny 
(1992) is one attempt to overcome the problem of incompleteness in both undirected graphs 
and DAGs.
Nevertheless, as was shown by Pearl and Verma (1987), the DAG can encompass a much 
wider range of c.i. models than the undirected graph. In particular it is much more capable 
of expressing causality (see for example Pearl and Verma 1991, Pearl and Wermuth 1992), 
although directed arcs in a DAG do not necessarily represent causal relationships.
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Figure 3.4. Verifying the statement D iL p F |£  lining d-neparation
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Pearl (1993) gives a review of the development of DAGs over the past decade.
3.2.4 C hain  graphs
One way to overcome some of the restrictions with the undirected and DAG forms is to combine 
both directed and undirected arcs in the same graph, known as a chain graph. This idea was 
first suggested by Verma (1988) and used by Lauritzen and Wermuth (1989). The properties 
of chain graphs were described by Frydenberg (1990).
Clearly such graphs are in a trivial sense more general than either the DAG or undirected 
graph, but they can also encompass c.i. models which neither of the other two forms are able 
to illustrate. For example, where the natural ordering of a set of variables is only partial, it 
may be that there is no obvious reason why an arc between two dependent variables should
point one way rather than the other. In such cases, linking them with an undirected arc in a 
chain graph may result in a more efficient representation of the c.i. structure. Chain graphs are 
usually drawn in a block-format, as shown in figure 3.5.
As given by Frydenberg (1990), the chain graph is characterised by the following properties:
(i) There are no cycles which both contain a directed element and respect the direction of all 
arrows.
(ii) The chain Markov property. This is equivalent to the d-separation criterion for DAGs, 
except that a chain component (that is, a set of nodes all of which are connected to each other 
by an undirected path) is considered as a single offspring, for the purposes of moralising the 
graph.
3.2.5 A pp lications o f graphical models
While there have been a number of applications for undirected graphs (Whittaker 1990) and 
chain graphs (Wermuth and Lauritzen 1990), by far the greatest interest has been shown in 
DAGs, particularly in conjuction with Bayesian methodology and in the context of expert 
systems.
The majority of such expert systems are in the field of medical diagnosis. Typically, a 
provisional model will be drawn up based on the opinions of medical experts (see for example 
Spiegelhalter and Cowell 1992), including a DAG representing the relations between all the 
variables perceived to be relevant, together with an ‘expert prior’ distribution for each variable, 
conditioned on its parents. An example from Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter (1988) of such a DAG 
is shown in figure 3.6.
Once a DAG has been constructed, and an appropriate joint prior distribution specified, 
data can then be used to update the marginal distributions of each variable. This process was 
first described by Pearl (1986) for the singly-connected DAG (that is where no two nodes have 
more than one path between them), using the Bayesian paradigm. It wnx later generalised to all 
DAGs by Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter (1988), and to the updating of conditional distributions 
by Spiegelhalter and Lauritzen (1990).
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Figure 3.6. An example of a DAG used in medical diagnosis
While most of the work in this area has concentrated on how to refine the model quantita­
tively using data, there has been increasing interest in the use of data to help construct and 
modify the qualitative aspects of the model, namely the shape of the DAG itself. Pearl (1988) 
and Speed (1990) were among the first to consider how data might be used to inform on the 
structure of a DAG. Cowell et al (1993) consider the use of scoring rules to evaluate how well 
the model fits the data qualitatively, and Spiegelhalter and Cowell (1992) describe a learning 
procedure which uses data to refine both qualitative and quantitative aspects of the model.
A review of the latest developments in this area may be found in Spiegelhalter et al (1993).
3.3 T he U se o f G raphical M odels in D ecision  Theory
The theory of graphical modelling can be extended to encompass models of a decision-theoretic 
nature. Such models are of particular interest as they take us one step closer to our goal: the 
modelling of games.
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3.3.1 Influence diagram s
An influence diagram is essentially a DAG adapted for use in decision analysis. This involves 
the introduction of two additional types of node. The chance nodes used in the DAG are still 
present, represented by circles. Decisions to be taken by the decision maker are represented by 
squares, and his utility by a diamond. These additions lead to two more conditions an ID must 
fulfill, over and above those required of a DAG.
D efinition 3.4 Lei R = R \ , . . . ,  R„ he a set of random vectors, D = D \ , . . . ,  Dn be a set of 
decisions to be taken by the decision maker II, and U bt II 's utility. Let Q = (Q,) = f ill  DUU. 
Then an influence diagram, or ID Iq consists of the set of nodes : Q, € Q } and a subset 
of the directed arcs {(Qi,Q j) '■ Q>,Qj € Q ,i £  j }, such that,
(i) for all Qi e Q , Qi i  An(Qi), in other words, Iq has no cycles,
(ii) for all Qi 6  Q, Qi H Q  \(Qi U De(g,))| P*{Qi) ,
(Hi) the directed arc (Qi, Dj), where Dj €  D, implies II knows Qi when taking decision D j , and 
(tv) De(U) = 0
Figure 3.7. An ID Representation of the Oil Wildcatter’s Problem
Figure 3.7 shows an ID representation (due to Shachtcr 1986) of Raiffa’s (1968) oil wildcatter 
problem. The wildcatter first decides whether or not to test the ground (T). He observes the 
test results R, which are related to the seismic structure 5  and volume of oil V. Having observed
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the test results, he decides whether to drill (D), whereupon his utility is a function some or all 
of T, D, V and C, the cost of drilling.
Two things are worth noting. Firstly, the d-separation criterion applies as in DAGs. How­
ever the interpretation is subtly different where decision nodes are involved, so the c.i. relations 
cannot be said to be strictly of a probabilistic nature. Therefore I will use the non-specific 
c.i. notation; in the above example we have T 11 V|5 and C  ±LV, S ,T  .
Secondly, the ID in figure 3.7 displays the property of perfect recall, or ‘no forgetting', as 
defined by Shachter (1986):
For D i, Dj € D,
D i£ \n ( D j)  = >  D iU PafD O C PafD j).
Shachter (1986) also required that there exist a directed path which passes through every 
decision node. We will see later what happens when these conditions are relaxed.
The influence diagram was first conceived (by Miller et al 1976) as part of a decision analysis 
computer system, but it was not until Howard and Matheson (1981) made the connection to 
probabilistic independence that the potential of the ID as an aid to decision making became 
apparent. Olmsted (1983) proposed a system for evaluating a decision problem using an ID, 
and Shachter (1986, 1988) completed the process, giving an algorithm for evaluating directly a 
wide class of IDs.
A number of rules have been developed for the drawing, manipulation and evaluation of IDs. 
These include the addition (Smith 1988) and deletion (Olmsted 1983) of nodes, arc reversal 
(Howard and Matheson 1981) and arc deletion (Smith 1989a), rules for taking advantage of 
specific types of dependencies between nodes (Smith 1989a, Tatman and Shachter 1990) and 
an algorithm for using the above operations (Shachter 1986). A more extensive list of rules is 
given in Smith (1988). Howard (1990) gives a good introduction to IDs and how to draw them 
in practice.
IDs have a number of uses. They can help with elicitation and the simplification of a 
problem (Smith 1989a, 1994). They can be used to calculate the expected value of information 
(Shachter 1986, Matheson 1990), and they can incorporate a variety of systems including belief 
adjustment (Goldstein 1990) and state-space forecasting (Smith 1990). Oliver and Smith (1990) 
contains a number of articles on applications of influence diagrams.
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3.3.2 A com parison w ith  decision tree«
The decision tree has been around for a long time and is a tried and tested graphical aid to 
decision analysis. So why do we need the ID, which on the face of it appears to involve a more 
difficult technique for analysing a problem? Well the first issue is one of complexity of the 
graph. For example the ID of the oil wildcatter’s problem in figure 3.7 comprised only seven 
nodes and nine arcs. The decision tree for the same problem has over 150 branches.
Figure 3.8. A section of the decision tree for the oil wildcatter’s problem
While putting in an additional variable or an extra decision adds only one node to an ID, it 
can double the size of a tree, or worse. However, an ID is also capable of modelling problems 
with continuous variables or decision spaces, something which can not be done with a tree, 
except in a schematic fashion. In both cases, the additional information required to solve a 
decision problem consists of a set of contingency tables, so I would argue that the comparison 
is a fair one.
The second advantage is computational efficiency. When evaluating a decision problem us-
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ing a tree, the usual method is to use backward induction, taking expectations or maximising 
as appropriate. Although this process is in itself quite straightforward, calculating the contin­
gencies at each stage may not be. Such calculations implicitly use conditional independence; in 
the above example, we have V ±LT, R, D\S , so the contingencies for V need only involve S.
But the ID is constructed explicitly to take advantage of such independencies as exist. Hence, 
as is shown by Pearl and Verma (1987) and Matheson (1990), IDs are a far more powerful tool 
for analysing and solving many decision problems, and the increasing use of IDs (and DAGs 
in general) in a variety of real-life situations (see Oliver and Smith 1990, Spiegelhalter et al
1993) bears witness to this claim. As the complexity of a problem increases, the computational 
advantage of an ID representation over a tree also tends to increase.
The third advantage of the ID and, I believe, the most important is its ability to accurately 
depict the qualitative structure of the model. The order of variables in a tree is very much 
constrained by the conditions on what a decision maker knows when taking a particular decision. 
This can lead to quite a cumbersome structure; in the oil wildcatter’s problem, for example, 
the result of the test of seismic structure is introduced before the seismic structure itself.
While the ID clearly illustrates the knowledge base for each decision, there is much more 
freedom in how it is drawn. The natural ordering of variables and decisions in a problem 
is often the best, although slight variations may yield greater computational efficiency. For 
example, in figure 3.7, the arc (V,S) could if it were more convenient be drawn the other way. 
Choosing the order in which variables are introduced can be tackled using the theory of dynamic 
programming; see for instance Kaplan (1982).
This aspect is most useful at the early stages of model building and evaluation (Smith
1994) , but it also allows the decision maker to apreciate which variables are most pertinent 
to their problem, and which decisions are likely to be the most important. The ID may give 
a better clue ns to why a particular decision might turn out to be optimal, in contrast to the 
handle-turning backwards induction approach based on the tree.
There are some problems which a tree models better than an ID. These tend to be either 
extremely simple cases (which comprise most of the examples of decision trees in the literature) 
or cases with very little symmetry, in other words where each branch from a vertex leads to 
a different set of possible values for the subsequent decision or random variable. Fung and 
Shachter (1990) have attempted to overcome these shortcomings by creating a tree-ID hybrid.
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Nevertheless, I would argue that many decisions taken in real life are sufficiently complex and 
symmetrical to severely reduce the efficacy of trees in analysing them.
3.3.3 O th e r graph-based  system s
Before the advent of the influence diagram and the algebra of conditional independence, much 
of the use of graphical and causal models was non-probabilistic or even non-quantitative, with 
systems such as non-monotonic or fuzzy logic much in evidence (see Blalock 1971). In the 
last decade, the use of probability has taken over. In fact this has been almost exclusively of a 
Bayesian nature, the reason being that anything other than a completely connected graph gives 
rise to a hierarchical model, for which the superiority of Bayesian methodology over classical is 
widely acknowledged.
However, for those who are unwilling to specify a point probability for an uncertain event, or 
for whom the problems associated with vague prior distributions lead to a feeling of uneasiness, 
there is a non-Bayesian approach which is currently in use. It is based on the Dempster-Shafer 
belief function, a type of lower probability; see Dempster (1968) and Shafer (1976, 1981) for 
details on the foundations of the belief function methodology.
The belief function is used by Dempster and Kong (1988) in conjunction with a graphoid 
structure based on logical relations. Dempster (1990) extends this structure to combine both 
logical and probabilistic relations between variables. Shafer and Shenoy (1988) have shown how 
belief functions can be propagated through an undirected graph known as a Markov tree.
Slightly closer in nature to the ID is Shenoy’s (1990) valuation network, an example of 
which for the oil wildcatter’s problem is shown in figure 3.9. The utility is split into two parts: 
profit from the test k and profit from drilling K. There is now an explicit prior probability 
p represented in the network, and the conditional probability p plays the same role as the 
unobserved variable S  in the original version. The cost of drilling is not explicitly included (but 
could be if necessary).
The main difference to the other graphical models described in this chapter is that the 
interpretation of the directed and undirected arcs is somewhat different. The system is geared 
to calculation of the conditional probabilities, rather than to describing the problem from a 
decision maker's point of view. Thus, although Shenoy (1990) claims that the computations 
involved are more efficient than those based on an ID representation, the system is much harder
32
to understand, so some of the modelling benefits of the ID are lost.
Figure 3.9. Shenoy’s (1990) Valuation Network of the Oil Wilcatter’s Problem
Shenoy (1991) shows how Dempster-Shafer belief functions, Spohn’s (epistemic) disbelief 
functions and Zadeh’s possibility functions fit into the framework of a valuation-based system.
3.3.4 M ore th a n  one decision m aker: tow ards a theory  of gam es
Consider again the oil wildcatter’s problem, and recall that the ID shown in figure 3.7 conforms 
to the axiom of perfect recall, or Shachter’s (1986) ‘no forgetting’ rule. In fact it makes no 
difference in this case, since Pa(T) = 0 and T  is completely determined by R  — in other words, 
if you know the (possibly null) result of a test, you will also know whether the test took place.
But in general this will not be so. The original description of the oil wildcatter’s problem by 
Raiffa (1968) included the possibility that he would have some background knowledge K j  (on 
the geography of the surrounding area and the type of seismic structure and volume of oil to 
expect). Now suppose the decisions are made by a company rather than an individual, and that 
the derisions on whether or not to test and drill are made by two different people within the 
company. Typically the driller will have some subset of the tester’s background information, 
which together with some information on the likely costs of drilling forms his knowledge base 
h'p. This can be modelled by the ID in figure 3.10.
Notice that the driller does not have all the available relevant information at his disposal. 
The tester does not pass on her entire background information, which might include specialist 
knowledge and past experience. It is still, however, a single decision making process, in which
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the decision maker (the company) ‘forgets’ some information between one decision and the next. 
We say the decisions are taken by two individual agents, but with the same goal or utility.
Figure 3.10. An ID of the Oil Company’s Problem
Now let us inject a further slice of realism into the model, by considering the personal 
objectives of the two individuals involved. To illustrate the point we will assume that they are 
only concerned with their own standing within the company, and don’t care one way or the 
other about the profit made by the company on this particular venture.
First the tester who needs to show that she knows when to test for seismic structure. Her 
utility Ut  will depend on the decision to test T, whether her results R give a good indication of 
the volume of oil V, and in terms of professional pride on whether R matches the true seismic 
structure S. The opportunity to observe V and 5  will depend on the decision to drill D. Finally 
recall tha t R determines T, so we have Pa (Ut ) = {V, 5, R, D},
As for the driller, his utility Up will depend on the volume of oil V and the cost of drilling 
C, both of which will be observed depending on D. So Pa(C/p) =  {V ,C ,D }. The complete 
model is shown in figure 3.11.
This is no longer a simple decision problem. There are three decision-makers involved: the 
tester, the driller and the company. The company does not have a decision to make and is 
passive. (It may decide to promote or dismiss either of the other two, but that is part of a 
much larger process, outside the scope of this model.) The decision problem has now become
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a game.
Figure 3.11. Even more problems for the Oil Company!
Although the extension of the model to encompass games looks fairly innocuous, there are 
some major issues to be considered. Firstly, each actor will view the actions of the other actors 
as variables, determined not by any chance mechanism (to which the well-founded calculus of 
probability can be applied) but by the thinking processes (rational or otherwise) of the other 
actors with respect to thctr utility.
This consideration is tackled by Smith (1988, 1994) and by Smith and Allard (1992). How­
ever, the presence of more than one actor raises even more profound questions. What do the 
actors know about each other? What factors will other actors take into account when taking 
their actions? How can a actor learn more about the other actors, even about himself? Does 
every actor have the same perception of the game, of even of the influence diagram used to 
model it?
A new foundational framework is required to tackle these issues; as far as I am aware, the 
only attem pt made so far to build such a framework is that of Allard and Smith (1992). In the 
next chapter I seek to improve and extend this foundational framework.
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4 The Basic Model
4.1 Prelim inaries
As we have seen, extending the use of influence diagrams from the decision problem involving 
a single decision maker to a game with two or more actors is not straightforward. It requires 
that we make a whole new set of assumptions about the nature and motivation of the actors 
involved. Now, I aim to state explicitly and justify each assumption being made, which means 
going right back to the foundations of game theory.
4.1.1 The; definition of a  gam e
In this chapter we construct, step by step, a new framework for modelling games based on 
the influence diagram representation. We start with a definition of a game which is stated in 
enough generality so as to encompass a very wide class of game-type models. It is consistent 
with other definitions employed in the game theory literature.
D efin ition  4.1 A game F\  is played by:
(i) a finite set of sentient actors Ils =  {II j , . . . ,  FI m }, and 
(it) the actor nature Iljv.
II =  II s U II jv is the set of actors.
Fy* consists of a finite set of actions A = {A i,. . . ,  A„). Each action At 6 A is taken by 
the corresponding agent wt 6 ir = { # i , . . . ,  *„}, where wt belongs to an actor Ily (xt € 11/^ for 
some Ily 6 II. We say that an agent which belongs to a sentient actor is sentient.
We also require the following terms.
D efin ition  4.2 I f an action At is taken, it assumes a value At = at, where at € At is the act 
chosen by ir<, and At is the action space [or At.
For any subset of actions X  = {A j)C  A, we define the set of acts (or values) x := {ay : 
Aj € X ] and the action space A x  '■= •
There are a number of points to note here. The first is that we have used the symbol € to 
denote two different relations: an agent belonging to a set of agents, and an agent belonging
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to an actor. The difference in meaning is related to the philosophical question of distinction 
between an actor and his set of agents. However, that need not concern us for the time being 
since identifying the two makes no difference to our model. Indeed we could just as well define 
an actor to be a subset of agents, with If partitioning x.
It is also worth considering the definition of nature as an actor. All the events in a game 
determined randomly or by chance are attributed to actions taken by nature. This device has 
been used since the start of game theory (see for example Kuhn 1953, Blackwell and Girshick 
1954). The ‘referee’ employed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) performs the same 
role.
There are two reasons why we use this definition. The first is purely for notational con­
venience. The second is to emphasise the similarity between the actions taken by sentient 
agents and those taken by agents of nature. Even though different types of process are in­
volved, namely the conscious decision and the chance or random process, they both result in 
the same type of object, namely an act. And once an act is chosen, and the value of that 
action determined, there is essentially no difference in quality between the sentient act and the 
act of nature. Only when we start to consider restrictions on the behaviour of sentient agents 
and make assumptions about the rationality of actors does the distinction between the types 
of action become apparent.
The device of the ‘agent’, as used, for example, by Kuhn (1953) and llarsanyi and Selten 
(1988) is also well known in game theory. We will base our theory on the agent rather than 
the actor primarily for reasons of generality. Initially, the entity of the actor will not enter our 
consideration except to motivate the definitions. In particular, we do not at this point assume 
any special connection between the actions taken by agents belonging to the same actor, lienee 
in a restricted sense, the number of actors in a game makes no difference to the qualitative 
structure we use to describe the game.
4.1.2 Soiiit- rem arks on thn  definition
I would like to comment on the generality of our definition of a game, and emphasise the paucity 
of assumptions made. As defined above, the term game covers just about any situation which 
involves one or more people doing things. There is no presumption ns to why or how or when 
an action is taken. Conditions such ns rationality, perfect recall and common knowledge have
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not been imposed; the implications of such conditions will be examined later.
There is, however, one important assumption we make, namely that the game is finite. 
Thus immediately we rule out a large class of games which have historically played a significant 
role in game theory. Now the inability to represent such an important genre of games might 
be considered a serious deficiency in any modelling framework. And I would not deny the 
possibility that the ID representation could be extended to include infinite games, in the same 
way that a DAG can be used (see Smith, 1990) to model an infinite time series. However there 
are good reasons why I choose not to tackle them here.
There are many ways of classifying games, whether it be by number of actors, perfectness 
or completeness of information, one-shot or repeated, finite or infinite games. And both the 
extensive and normal form models of games have different strengths and weaknesses when it 
comes to representing these different classes of games. The influence diagram model which I 
define in this chapter is equally capable of representing games with imperfect or incomplete 
information, the number of actors makes little difference, and finitely repeated games can be 
accommodated without too much difficulty.
In fact, action spaces with uncountable cardinality can be accommodated just as easily as 
the countable or finite. But there are serious issues involved if we wish to consider games with 
infinitely many actions. For a start it is well known that an infinite game cannot simply be 
considered as the limiting case of a finite game, hence the well-documented divergence in results; 
sec Howard (1971). Furthermore there are foundational problems which present themselves; 
for example, the extension of a theorem from a space with finitely many to countably many 
dimensions is non-trivial. In the particular rase of the ID, while the (weaker) local Markov 
property may apply equally to an infinite graph as to a finite one, the extension of the global 
Markov property is not so straightforward.
Intuitively, we may consider infinite games to be on a completely different level in a qual- 
ilatiue sense from finite games. And since the ID representation emphasises especially the 
qualitative aspects of a game, we might expect that the foundational treatment of the infi­
nite would need to he quite different from that of the finite. Detailed consideration of the 
foundations of infinite games is beyond the scope of this thesis.
38
4.1.3 Scheduling graphs
We will now begin to introduce some basic assumptions regarding the qualitative structure of 
the games which are to be considered. These assumptions are common to every framework for 
modelling games of which I am aware: so common that they are rarely stated. Nevertheless 
in the spirit of comprehensiveness, which I propounded above, each assumption made will be 
stated explicitly.
D efinition 4.3 We say an agent Xj admits At if the value At = ai is an input to the process 
of taking the action A j .
Let us consider how this should be interpreted. Firstly, there is the assumption of a process, 
or algorithm in computing terms, which determines which act at £ A, is to be chosen. What 
does it imply for a particular value to be an input of such an algorithm? If xj is sentient, then 
we would say that xj knows or has observed A< = a, when it takes action A j. In this respect 
we consider the faculties of an actor to be delegated to his agents.
In the case where xj is an agent of nature, Aj could be thought of as a function of Ai, or 
more generally as a response to Ai. Such functions can be either deterministic or stochastic. 
For example, in the context of a probabilistic system, Aj would be distributed with some set 
of parameters which include Ai.
D efinition 4.4 A scheduling graph G is a directed acyclic graph on A such that Ai £ l’a( A j) 
if and only if Xj admits Ai.
A game Tx is scheduled i f  its scheduling graph exists.
To ensure the existence of a scheduling graph, we require that the pattern of admissions 
does not induce any cycles, in other words that,
there is no sequence C A such that iT(i) admits /l(m) and admits
/4(<) for i s  1 , . . , ,  m — 1.
Thus we rule out games involving clairvoyance and similar phenomena.
In addition, it must be clear whether or not xj admits Ai for all pairs of actions (Ai ,A j ). 
This is not a trivial assumption, since it rules out games where the order of some of the actions 
is undetermined, and may depend on another action taken during the game. An example might 
be a game of chess where the first action Ao is the toss of a coin to determine who plays white.
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However, this restriction does not necessarily prevent us from modelling such games; if the 
rules of a game allow for the order of some actions to be determined by the value of another, we 
can usually overcome this by carefully defining the actions, and if necessary including additional 
actions some of which may turn out to be null, depending on another value in the game. So 
for example in the game of chess, we could add the variable A\ which returns the value ai (the 
first actor’s first move) if Ao — 'heads’, and 0 otherwise. (Alternatively we might swap the 
actors round or analyse the two versions separately).
Note that if it exists, the scheduling graph is unique.
In a scheduling graph, we use the obvious notation: an action taken by an agent of nature 
is denoted by a circle, one by a sentient agent denoted by a square. A simple example of a 
scheduling graph is given in figure 4.1. An agent of nature x, takes action A i, choosing an 
act a i which is observed by the two sentient agents x3 and x3, as specified by the presence of 
the directed arcs (A i,A ]) and (Ai ,A3). Then x2 takes its action Aj, the result of which is 
observed by x3 (according to the arc (Aj, As)) before it takes action A3.
Figure 4.1. A simple scheduling graph
The scheduling graph induces the natural partial ordering on A,
At ■< Aj 4=> At € An(Ay).
Thus an alternative way to define the scheduling graph would be to invoke the (sufficient) 
partial ordering axioms,
(i) Transitivity: At -< Aj and Aj ■< A» =*■ At -< A*.
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(ii) Mutual exclusiveness: A, /  Aj or Aj Ai.
This natural partial ordering motivates the following definition.
D efinition 4.5 In a scheduled game, Ai occurs before Aj (tn game time,! if At € An(Aj) in G. 
So for instance, in figure 2.1, A i occurs before Aj and As.
There is an important distinction to be drawn between real time and game time. What 
matters in a game is not when an action is taken, but when the result of that action starts to 
affect other actions in the game. Thus two games in which the real time order of actions differs, 
but which nevertheless have the same game time partial ordering, are considered identical for 
the purposes of our theory. For example, if an action taken by an agent of nature (say the 
determination of some unknown global constant) is admitted for the first time part of the way 
through a game, then it makes no difference whether the constant was determined at the start 
of the game, or immediately previous to its admission. Thus in modelling a game we can 
choose which representation is most convenient, according to dynamic programming principles 
as mentioned in the previous chapter.
4.2 O rientation
We now turn to what is perhaps the focal point of game theory: what motivates an agent to 
choose one act rather than another. We need to consider the effect a game has on an agent and 
what part its action has to play. In other words, what rewards are available to the agent, what 
are the preferences of the agent, and how do they affect the way it acts. As always, we start 
with the basics.
D efin ition  4.6 The outcome A — a of a game Ts is the set of acts a = (<i|,. . . ,  a„ ) 6 A taken 
hy the agents w, where A  := ** ^ e outcome space.
4.2.1 P red isposition  an d  u tility
Every sentient actor derives some benefit (or loss) as a direct consequence of any outcome. We 
can describe the relation between outcome and benefit in terms of a predisposition with which 
each agent belonging to that actor is presumed to be endowed.
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D efinition  4.7 The predisposition Vj of a sentient agent w, £ Ilj defines an ordering of the 
space of outcomes A  such that for all a, a' 6 A,
Vi(a) >■ Vi(a’) <=> a is more beneficial to Ilj than a1,
Vj(a) ~  Vi(a') <=> a and a' are equally beneficial to Jlj,
and
*■*, *< 6 II, = *  V» =  Vi.
We define the set V :=
We can then determine the utility to each agent of a particular outcome.
D efin ition  4.8 The utility Ui(A) of a sentient agent Wi is, without loss of generality, a real- 
valued function satisfying,
for all a, o' 6 A.
Ui(a) > Ui(a') K(a) v  Vi(a'),
Ui(a) = Ui(a') <=> K(a) ~  Kia'),
Ui(a) =  Uj(a) if ir, and belong to the same actor,
• set V  := {Uu . ..,U n)
Note that, according to the above definition, the utility may be either cardinal or ordinal.
At first sight it seems as if predisposition and utility are one and the same thing. However, 
within our concept of a game, they perform distinct roles.
Predisposition can be considered as an expression of the state of an agent at the start of 
the game, defined in terms of the potential benefits of that game. By definition, it determines 
a scale by which the gains or losses of the agent resulting from any outcome can be measured. 
In other words, it defines what is better for the agent. The agent may know its predisposition 
entirely, or alternatively may have some uncertainty about it. We make no assumption either 
way.
We might ask how an agent comes to be in a certain state, to have one predisposition rather 
than another. There are a number of possibilities. The agent may simply be endowed with its 
predisposition, much in the same way as the hypothetical Bayesian is assumed to be endowed
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with a prior distribution over some unknown variable. Alternatively the predisposition could be 
thought of as a function of some other act of nature. An example of this which is quite common 
in the game theory literature (see for example Harsanyi 1967) is when an actor is presumed 
to be drawn at random from some population for which the distribution of predispositions is 
known.
I suppose it is possible that we might want to model a game in which an actor ‘joins in 
half-way through’, so that a previous action by a sentient agent might affect the identity of that 
actor and hence the predisposition of his agents. Nevertheless, in each case we may without 
loss of generality consider a predisposition V) as an action taken by an agent of nature jr(Vj), 
and we interpret its relations to other actions in the game accordingly. It is, however, a very 
special type of action, being identified with a specific sentient agent, which is why we have 
given it separate treatment in the development of our theory.
The utility represents the realisation by an agent of the benefit which results from a partic­
ular outcome. The relationship between predisposition and utility is analogous to that between 
the preposterior and posterior distribution in Bayesian analysis. The importance of distin­
guishing between them will becomes clear when we incorporate utility into our model, using 
the orientation graph.
At this point it is worth noting that, although the minimalist definitions of predisposition 
and utility given above imply the existence only of ordinal utility, other forms of utility can be 
used within this framework. For example, we could construct a cardinal utility by extending 
the predisposition to be an ordering of all lotteries over A , as demonstrated by Savage (1954).
4.2.2 T he o rien ta tio n  g raph
D efin ition  4.9 An orientation graph H is a directed acyclic graph onQ  = A U U U W  where 
W C V  and:
(i) the subgraph of H on A is the scheduling graph G, that is H\a — G.
(ii) for all nodes Vt € W, Q, € A U W \  V,,
V{ 6  Pa(Qy) if and only if x(Qj) admits V) and 
Q) € Pa(V)) if and only if n(Vi) admits Qj.
(in) the utility nodes U are terminal nodes, that is De(f7) = 0.
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(iv) for all a, a' e  A auw ,
a |p«<tf,) =  a '| p ^ v () = *  Ui(a) =  Ui(a.').
(v) H is minimal, that is there is no proper subgraph of H on A U l/U W  which satisfies (i)-(iv) 
above.
From now on we will consider that a game r a consists of the set of objects Q, as defined 
above.
Given a scheduling graph, an orientation graph will always exist, since putting Pa(i/,) =  A 
for all ■ trivially satisfies condition (iv). However uniqueness is not guaranteed, even after 
fixing the subset W . For example, if Aj and A t are deterministically related actions taken by 
agents of nature such that at = oy + 1, then Aj and At will be interchangeable with respect 
to membership of Pa(Uj).
It may seem just a little odd that the definition of the orientation graph does not specify 
any particular connection between the predisposition and utility nodes of a sentient agent. This 
surprising omission is deliberate. My intention is to encompass the widest possible variety of 
games within the modelling framework; to specify a particular graphical connection within the 
definition would either be over restrictive or long-winded and cumbersome. Thus, while I claim 
that most ‘sensible’ games can be modelled using this framework, not all models which fit the 
framework necessarily correspond to a game which could be described as ‘sensible’.
My idea of a sensible game involves some connection between predisposition and utility. I 
would also like to prevent agents from choosing their own predisposition. While this interesting 
possibility is allowable given the above definition, it does raise the problem of what motivates 
an agent to choose a particular predisposition; might we need a pre-predisposition? To achieve 
these ends, I suggest the following conditions:
(vi) If V{ € W  then Vt € An(£/<), and
(vii) A, i  An(I?().
In fact the equivalent definition in Allard and Smith (1992) specifies Vi € Pa({/<), and I 
suspect that in many games this will be the case. Allard and Smith (1992) also restrict the 
orientation graph to the case bV = V. By allowing ourselves more flexibility in the way a game 
is represented, we are presented with an additional problem: which predisposition nodes to
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include. In fact there are no hard and fast rules on this one; it comes down to a matter of 
judgement as to what aspects of a game we are trying to model. We will return to this question 
later in the thesis.
Figure 4.2 shows two possible orientation graphs for the game corresponding to the schedul­
ing graph illustrated in figure 4.1. In Hi, the predispositions are not included, and the two 
utility nodes are drawn to represent each utility being a function only of actions Aj and ^ 3. 
In / / j ,  the action At represents the equivalent of a ‘common prior’ (as described by llarsanyi 
1967). Each sentient agent knows only its own predisposition, which is in the parental set of 
its utility.
Figure 4.2. Two possible versions of the orientation graph
Now our model is taking shape; it actually looks like an influence diagram. In fact, we 
have all the ingredients needed to model a game with a single actor possessing perfect recall 
(the standard requirement in a decision problem). However, we have not yet begun to tackle 
the issues raised by the inclusion of more than one actor, or even of a single actor with unco­
ordinated agents. We now start down that road by making what is probably the biggest 
assumption in this thesis.
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D efinition 4.10 Say a game is orientated if iij orientation graph H is common knowledge 
among the sentient agents {?Tj € Ify : Ilj € IIs).
Thus for a game to be orientated, we require that every agent has an identical perception of 
that part of the structure of the game which is prescribed by the orientation graph. Moreover, 
each agent’8 perception must include the knowledge that every other agent has an identical per­
ception to itself. This is a very strong assumption. It may hold for simple ‘parlour’ games, such 
as chess. But for many ‘real-life’ situations, it may be implausible as a descriptive assumption.
On the other hand, we have to begin somewhere, and common knowledge of the basic 
structure of a game is a natural starting point. Indeed most other modelling systems for games 
require far stronger assumptions involving quite detailed common knowledge of the model. 
(One exception is Bennett’s (1987) theory of hypergames, which allows actors to have differing 
perceptions of games at the structural level.) As with any other model, ours represents an 
approximation of the true situation in which certain assumptions are made which may not 
be correct. It may be interesting to consider the consequences of weakening this common 
knowledge condition; such considerations are, however, beyond the scope of this thesis.
4.3 P rosp ective  Functions
When seeking to model how an agent may act in a given situation, we assume that the act 
chosen will depend on the stimuli with which the agent is presented when it takes the action. 
There are two types of stimuli which may have some effect on an agent’s action, and which we 
therefore need to consider. The first is admission of the values of some of the other actions in 
the game as defined in the orientation graph. This is sufficient for an action taken by an agent 
of nature; such an action is determined (up to a stochastic level) by its parental actions.
For an action Ai taken by the sentient agent »<, however, there is an extra ingredient to 
take into account. In addition to knowing the set of values {qj : Q, € Pa(A<)}, t, may have 
certain beliefs about what values of the set {Qj : Qj € (J \(A | U I’a(A|))) do or will obtain. 
Clearly such beliefs may impinge on the decision process of the agent ir, We choose to model 
these beliefs via a form of conditional possibility function, known as a prospective function.
4 .3 .1  C o n d it io n in g  on  e x p e r ie n ce
Firstly, we need to generalise the admission of an action by a sentient agent to include all 
hypothetical cases.
D efinition 4.11 Let x< be a sentient agent. Hi’s experience Y  is defined to be the (possibly 
hypothetical) admission by x; of the set Y  C Q.
D efinition 4.12 We define the prospective function of a sentient agent x( to be fl((.|.) where, 
for X,  Y  C Q and X  C A x ,  B i (X \Y)  represents Xj’s belief in X  given experience Y , and
Bi : ( * , v ) ~ [ 0, 1).
I f Bi(X\Z)  > B i ( y \Z )  then we say that, given experience Z,  Xj has a greater belief in X  than
in y.
In principle, we could have defined the prospective function as 0i(.V|J>), where y  C A y , on 
all pairs of subsets of subspaces of A q . However, according to the definition of admission (and 
hence of experience), an agent either knows a value or it doesn’t. So any subset of an action 
space other than a single value is inadmissible in that sense. In fact, for any given agent x<, 
the only prospective functions which directly impinge on its action Ai are those of the form,
Bi(X\y)
for p 6 A p^ a ,) and X  6 {«VC A x  '■ X  CQ}.
4.3.2 P ro p e rtie s  o f th e  prospective function
We now consider a number of properties which a prospective function Hi may have.
Let X,  Y, Z C Q ,  with x , x '  € A x ,  A y  and z € A x .
Bl B i(A x \v ) = 1.
B2 /f,(0[C Ax]\v) = 0.
B3 Bi(x\x ,y)  =  1.
B4 Bi(x\x ' , y) m 0 if * yt x'.
B5 Bi(x\y) < Bi(X\y)  ¡ f * € * C  A x .
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B6 Bi(x,  ylz) <  f l ,( i |i) .
B7 Bi(x\y)  = 0 => Bi(x\y , z) = 0.
B8 Bi(x\y) = 1 = >  B i ( x \ y , z )=  I.
B9 Bi(x,  y|r) =  Bi(x\y,  z) • fl,(y|*).
The first issue which arises is whether a term fl<( |y) is well defined for a given experience Y. 
For instance, this might not be the case when dj(y|0) =  0. Since properties B1 and B2 relate 
to whether an agent believes the set of actions X  will be taken at all, we will consider them to 
be axiomatic, thus defining the terms involved. For every other property, we need to add the 
caveat: ‘provided every term is well defined’.
Next, we consider properties B3 and B4. In order to gain any useful insight, we have to 
assume that admitting a fact, having observed it or knowing it, an agent will believe that 
it is true; as the saying goes, ‘seeing is believing’. Conversely, an agent should believe false 
anything which is (logically) mutually exclusive to anything it admits. B3 and B4 represent 
these principles in the context of a prospective function, including one for which =  1
implies certainty. This motivates our next definition.
D efin ition  4.13 An agent is said lo be intelligent if BS and B f hold provided every term is 
well defined.
This is our first step along the road towards a theory of rationality. In principle, it is quite a 
big step since it involves putting restrictions on the beliefs an agent may hold; as we have seen, 
this is a highly contentious area within game theory. Nevertheless, it does seem reasonable to 
require that any data which forms part of the input to a thought process is preserved (in some 
form) in the output.
Properties B5-B8 are monotonicity conditions. Property B9 represents a further restriction 
on the shape of an agent’s prospective function. Such a condition applies to a number of 
prospective functions, although in some cases the equality may be replaced by an inequality. 
The list of properties given above is by no means exhaustive. B3 B9 can be extended naturally 
to cover beliefs about subsets in the form B t(X | ).
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4 .3 .3  E xam ples
To illustrate what exactly is meant by a prospective function, we now consider a variety of 
types of belief which an agent in a game might hold. In each case we will assume that the agent 
is intelligent, so properties B1-B4 hold.
We start with what is perhaps the simplest non-trivial prospective function. The zero-one 
possibility function (not to be confused with the possibility function of nonmonotonic logic, as 
described by Zadeh (1979) and others) represents whether an agent believes a certain set of 
values is possible given some experience.
D efin ition  4.14 We say Bi is a zero-one possibility function if,
Bi(X\ y)  =
1 if Jr,- believes X  =  x  is possible for some x €  X  given experience Y  = y, and 
0 otherwise.
Of the properties given above, B5 follows from the definition of the possibility function. 
B6 and B9 rely on certain regularity conditions associated with coherence of belief. B7 is a 
corrollary of B6 and B9, and B8 is in general false.
Alternatively, Bj(A'|y) may express some degree of belief about X  given Y  on the part of ir 
This might be in terms of upper and lower probabilities, as defined in a subjective framework 
by Smith (1961), and advocated by Binmore (1991) as an alternative to precise ‘Bayesian’ 
probabilities in a game-theory context.
An upper probability may be seen as a refinement of the zero-one possibility function defined 
above. The use of lower probabilities is far more common, mainly in the form of the Dempster- 
Sliafer belief function. (In fact, while the belief function is formulated as a lower probability, 
the upper probability of a set is simply the lower probability of its complement)
We denote the conditional belief function Bel,-(-|-) (as a form of prospective function) and 
define it according to Shafer (1976). If we assume Dempster's (1968) rule of combination, then 
B5, B6 and B8 follow immediately. Instead of B9 we have,
B9' 0 ,( c ,y |* ) > 4 ( x |y .* ) - 4 ( y |t ) ,
and B7 is in general false.
As we have already seen, belief functions can be incorporated within modelling frameworks 
based on graphical models. For an overview of some other approaches to probabilistic reasoning,
for example the use of previsions, see Fine (1973) and Walley (1991).
At the most structured end, let be an idealised Bayesian, endowed with universal priors 
and infinite computational capability. Then (provided all terms are well-defined),
Bi(A'|V') = Pr(x G -V|y), for all X  C A x  ■
Properties B5 B9 all hold.
It is worth noting that even this last special case of the prospective function is more general 
than the usual Bayesian paradigm, since it makes no assumptions about what forms of belief 
may be held by other agents, even those belonging to the same actor. Thus it is perfectly 
possible within our framework to model a game in which, for example, one agent is a Bayesian, 
another will commit itself only to non-trivial belief functions, and a third refuses to contemplate 
anything beyond the notion of possibility.
4.3.4 T he scope o f th e  prospective function
Earlier, we stated that the prediposition of a sentient agent could be considered as an action 
taken by an agent of nature. Consequently, an agent’s prospective function will incorporate 
beliefs about predispositions, including its own, in the same form as beliefs about other actions. 
Uncertainty about any predisposition on the part of a sentient agent represents a form of 
incomplete information — a form which occurs most often in the study of zero sum repeated 
games (see for example Bergin, 1992).
Hence the agent will have certain beliefs about the relative advantages to it of various 
outcomes, and for any individual actor these may differ between its agents. Thus the use of 
predisposition nodes in our theory allows us to represent the learning process an actor goes 
through as a result of his experiences in the game.
In the next section, we see how an agent’s beliefs about its utility (incorporating information 
about its predisposition) relate to its preference over the possible outcomes of the game. Hence 
we have built in a mechanism by which the preferences of an actor can change over the course 
of a game. I believe that such a system is much more realistic than one in which the preferences 
of the actors are fixed at the start of the game, and never vary.
We have not addressed the question of the infinite hierarchy of beliefs, as described in 
chapter 2. Such an infinite hierarchy could be constructed by incorporating into an agent's
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prospective function its beliefs about another's prospective function, which would in turn in­
clude beliefs about that of the first agent, and so on. Now, there are ways of dealing with such 
an infinite hierarchy (see for example Mertens and Zamir 1985). But all such methods impose 
consistency conditions, such as coherence and a common prior, on the nature of actors' beliefs 
which I think are unduly restrictive. One of the most interesting questions in game theory is 
what happens when the beliefs of actors are inconsistent; by excluding that possibility game 
theory moves one step further from reality.
My approach has been quite deliberate: to avoid as far as possible the infinite hierarchy, 
and to ignore (at least for now) whatever cannot be avoided. This was done firstly by requiring 
the orientation graph to be common knowledge. Now of course common knowledge does itself 
represent an infinite belief hierarchy; what characterises common knowledge is that the infinite 
hierarchy is one of certainty rather than uncertainty. Thus it avoids the problems generally 
associated with the infinite hierarchy of beliefs.
Secondly, by restricting the domain of the prospective function to beliefs about objects in 
the set Q, we ignore the infinite hierarchy of beliefs about beliefs. This is not a deficiency in 
the model, and the reason for this is very simple. All an agent cares about are those aspects 
of the game which affect its utility, namely a subset of Q. And the only things which affect 
the objects in that subset and which the agent may experience are other objects in Q. Hence 
considering Q alone is sufficient to produce a complete theory.
Of course, in determining its prospective function, an agent may well take into account some 
hypothesis about what the other agents believe, and in that sense the infinite hierarchy still 
exists. But the only reason for an agent doing this is to assist in the refinement of its prospective 
function, which summarises the useful aspects of an agent's beliefs, namely its marginal beliefs 
about Q.
4 . 4  B elief Influence Diagrams
This chapter has seen the devlopment of two concepts: the construction of a graphical model 
in the form of the orientation graph and the formulation of a belief framework as embodied 
in the prospective function. We are now in a position to combine these two ideas to form a 
unified modelling framework for games. One further ingredient is needed to bind it all together,
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namely conditional independence.
4.4.1 B elief cond itional independence
For this purpose we require a new version, known as belief conditional independence (b.c.i.).
D efinition 4.15 Let X , Y , Z C Q .  Say: “Given Z, X  is belief conditionally independent 
o fY  “ (notation X  11 b Y \Z  )  if it is common knowledge among all sentient agents that for all 
X  C A x ,  the prospective function Bi(X\(Y,  Z)  = (y, z)) of any sentient agent jr* can he written 
as a function of Z  alone.
Formally, we define:
X U -b ,Y \Z  if B i(X \(Y ,Z ))li.vY \Z [A ) for all X  C A x , and 
X 1 L b Y \ Z , if for all »,• 6  I lj , * X  IL b , Y \Z  ’G / i ( n s ).
We require that b.c.i. conforms to the same axioms C1-C3 as probabilistic c.i.
4.4.2 D efinition o f a BID
D efinition 4.16 A belief influence diagram (BID) l  on a set of objects Q is a directed acyclic 
graph drawn in such a way that the following statements hold:-
Qi ±LBQ \(Q i U De(Q,))| Pa(Q0 , for all Q, G Q. (4.1)
Thus a BID represents some subset of those c.i. relations between actions for which it is 
common knowledge that every sentient agent (according to its prospective function) believes 
them to be the case.
We now make the following assertion:
The orientation graph H is a belief influence diagram.
To start with, we note that it is sufficient to show that condition 4.1 holds for each of the 
four types of object in Q: actions by sentient agents, actions by agpnts of nature, predispositions 
and utilities. In addition, we recall that the orientation graph H is common knowledge to all 
sentient agents in the game. So any relations between objects in the graph must be relations 
of belief, commonly held by all agents. Hence any derived c.i. relations must be b.c.i. relations.
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Now, consider the action Aj  taken by a sentient agent wj. From definition 4.4, A, e  Pa(Aj) 
in G = H\a if and only if Xj admits Ai. So the set Pa(Aj) is exactly the set of actions known 
by tj when it takes action Aj.  An act aj can only depend on what the agent knows when it 
takes action Aj,  and what it believes about the things it does not know. In other words, given 
experience Pa(A,), Aj  is conditionally independent of every other act or predisposition which 
is not taken after it (in game time), namely the set A  U V \  (Aj  U De(Aj )).
Similarly, we may argue that Aj is conditionally independent of every utility, the value of 
which is not realised after it, that is U \  (Aj U De(Ay)), given that experience. Combining these 
two results gives us condition 4.1.
Next, consider an action Aj taken by an agent x; 6 Iljv From Definitions 4.3 and 4.4, 
Ai € Pa(Aj) in G if and only if the value A, = a, is an input to the process which results in 
action Aj  being taken by Tj : in other words, if and only if Aj  is a (random) function of Ai. 
So, as above, Aj  is conditionally independent of its non-descendants, given its parents, and 
condition 4.1 is satisfied. The same applies to a predisposition Vi, which is considered as an 
action taken by an agent of nature.
In the case of a utility Ui, from definition 4.9 we have
(iii) the utility nodes U are terminal nodes, that is De(t/) = 0.
(iv) for all a, a' € A auW,
°Ips<1/,) =  o'|p«(t/,) = *  tM “ ) =  V i(a').
Together these properties are equivalent to condition 4.1.
Thus our assertion is justified. There remains one further question; the non-uniquness of the 
BID. As with other forms of graphical model, not every set of b.c.i. relations can be represented 
in a single BID, and in general there is no unique minimal BID.
However, in an orientated game, the orientation graph is uniquely defined. Therefore, all we 
need do is specify that the BID of a game is that orientation graph, and is common knowledge.
D efinition 4.17 An onrntaied game Ts m said to he belief-stuctured if its BID l  is the same 
as ifs orientation graph H, and I is common knowledge to all sentient agents.
Henceforth, wr assume that all games are belief-structured.
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4.4.3 A ssum ptions abou t the  m odel
In all its essential aspects, our model is now complete. We have defined a comprehensive 
framework for the graphical representation of the qualitative structure of a game. We now 
consider its implications.
While my aim is to keep the scope of the model as wide as possible, a number of important 
assumptions are unavoidable. To begin with, we restrict ourselves to the consideration of finite 
games only. As was explained earlier, this is not necessarily because the BID cannot be used 
to represent infinite games, but because the analysis of such games is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.
Next we have to fix the (partial) order in which actions are taken, and specify which agent 
takes them. As I argued earlier, these considerations do not for the most part prevent us 
from modelling games with a looser structure, but the graph of such a game may turn out to 
be overcomplicated. We must also specify the space of acts Ai available to every agent t,. 
Although this is very important in mathematical terms, the practical implications do not pose 
us too much of a problem; if we wish to model a game in which an action space may vary 
(for example, depending on the value of another action), this can be taken care of simply by 
including additional actions.
Then we assume that there exist predispositions and corresponding utilities for each sentient 
agent, and that these are identical for every agent belonging to a given actor. On the first point 
generality is preserved, since we do not require that an agent knows its predisposition; indeed, 
we are able to model a situation in which an agent neither knows nor believes anything about 
its predisposition. There remains the question of whether a predisposition must necessarily 
exist. Such a philosophical question is beyond the scope of this thesis.
On the second point, there is an apparent loss of generality; I say apparent because I cannot 
imagine a situation in which we might want to model an actor as having agents with differing 
predispositions or utilities. We are, however, able to represent situations in which an actor has 
differing perceptions (or beliefs) of his utility over the duration of a game, simply by prescribing 
different prospective functions for his agents. The most important implication is that a sentient 
actor is identified with a particular set of agents, thus providing him with an identity.
Now let us consider the representation of belief in our model. With the exception of a few
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common knowledge conditions, an agent’s beliefs are encompassed by its prospective function, 
which is restricted to beliefs about actions. As was explained earlier, this does not mean that 
agents do not have beliefs about other things, but merely that for the time being we do not need 
to include them in our model. Furthermore, the prospective function is capable of modelling 
just about any form of belief, whether vague or precise, ordinal or cardinal.
We defined intelligence with respect to an agent as meaning that it believes in what it 
knows to be true (that is it assigns a belief of 1), and does not believe in what it knows to 
be false (belief 0). Suppose an agent’s prospective function contradicts this condition. Then it 
is effectively ignoring some piece of information or experience available to it. In other words, 
it does not admit (in either sense of the word) that action, and we should incorporate the 
consequent reduction of input in our model by leaving out the appropriate directed arc. Hence, 
without loss of generality, we may assume that every sentient agent is intelligent.
The most significant feature, however, of our treatment of belief is the nature of the prospec­
tive function itself. Unlike the other attributes of an agent, such as predisposition or utility, the 
prospective function is not represented explicitly in the BID. The reason is that the prospective 
function represents beliefs about all the objects in the BID. Inclusion of those beliefs as nodes 
in the BID would lead in general to an infinite hierarchy of beliefs: an unnecessary complication 
in my opinion. It would also contravene the principle of separation between belief and utility, 
as advocated for example by Savage (1954).
Clearly the trickiest part of the model is the identification of the orientation graph, based 
primarily on a partial ordering of actions, with the BID, based on a set of b.c.i. relations. Now, 
it is already specified that the orientation graph is common knowledge. Thus it is common 
knowledge that every sentient agent knows the structure of the graph, and hence, by the 
arguments set out above, it must be common knowledge that this is what every sentient agent 
believes.
But why should such beliefs necessarily take the form of a set of c.i. relations? Apart from 
the reasoning used above to justify this assertion, we ran appeal to the wrll-docuinented link 
between graphical models and c.i., as described in chapter 3. It seems natural that this link 
should apply to any model of the same form, in terms of both the form of relation and thr
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axioms to which it conforms. Indeed, Smith (1988) postulates that,
.. any sensible concept of informedness between variables should exhibit such a
c.i. stucture.”
As far as I am concerned, all the other assumptions pale into insignificance beside the 
common knowledge conditions we impose. They represent a major restiction on the applicability 
of our model to any real-life situation. However, as I have said before, they are both minimal 
(less than in any other modelling system I know of) and necessary; the theory in the following 
chapters won’t work without them.
4 .4 .4  Som e co m p ariso n s
How does our construction of an influence diagram compare with that of others. Shachter 
(1986) introduced a distinction between arcs, with those directed into a decision node implying 
knowledge of a random variable, and all other arcs having the same pure c.i. interpretation as 
in a DAG. Smith (1989a) defined the same construction with greater rigour, incoporating a 
‘third party’ decision analyst, for whom the client’s decisions would also be random variables, 
thus facilitating a uniform interpretation of c.i. relations across all objects.
We have taken a fundamentally different approach. By considering random variables to be 
actions taken by agents (of nature), we have been able to utilise a uniform concept of ‘influence’, 
namely that of admission, to construct a partial ordering of actions. This partial ordering, as 
defined by the scheduling graph, forms the foundations of our model, and only later have we 
introduced a version of c.i.
Now, we could have taken a short cut and simply defined the BID in accordance with some 
set of b.c.i. relations. But by going the long way round, we have accomplished two things. The 
first is to justify the connection between the graph and b.c.i. The second, and most important, 
is to explain why agents in a game ought to have these sorts of beliefs in the first place.
For the essential distinction between our version of an influence diagram and that of Sharhter 
(1986), and to a lesser extent Smith (1989a), is that ours represents the perception* of the ngents. 
This may or may not correspond to the fine situation, providing of course that such a true 
situation exists. To summarise: while our definition of the BID corresponds with the usual ID 
formulation in so far as the b.c.i. relations follow an identical pattern, the interpretation of the
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BID is very different.
Finally, I would like to compare the BID with the more usual graphical representation of 
a game: the extensive form. We have already done the equivalent comparison between the 
ID and the decision tree, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the same advantages will 
obtain:
less complexity in the graph for models with symmetry;
the ability to model faithfully problems involving continuous variables;
computational efficiency;
the ability to accurately depict the qualitative structure of the model.
Now, at the end of chapter 2, I identified the inability to model complex problems as a 
deficiency in both the extensive and normal forms. The first three qualities listed above suggest 
that the BID represents a considerable improvement in this respect; examples to justify this 
claim are given later in the thesis. But its real strength as a modelling framework lies in its 
representation of qualitative structure.
It turns out that we can analyse a game using only the BID and a few simple principles. 
Such analysis allows us to simplify the game before any precise numerical distributions are 
introduced. Any simplifications we can make at the start represent a considerable reduction of 
effort, both in terms of the elicitation of beliefs and computation.
In chapter 5, I put forward a theory of sufficiency, based on the rationality of sentient agents; 
by introducing a principle of parsimony, we can deduce conditions for the BID under which an 
agent will rationally ignore certain information. In chapter 6, we consider a number of ways in 
which this theory can be used to simplify a BID.
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5 Another Look at Rationality
So far, we have not said much about rationality, apart from the observation that there is no 
universally accepted definition of it. In this chapter we consider what ‘rational’ agents have 
in common that makes them rational. We attempt to construct a minimalist definition of 
rationality: some set of properties which we hope everyone can agree that a rational agent 
ought to display.
I see rationality as being fundamentally related to the concept of optimality; what is best 
for the agent ought to be rational for it as well. Before we can develop a theory of rationality, 
therefore, we must consider what is meant by optimality. We need to take into account the 
frame of reference: what makes an optimal action optimal. Then there is the question of how 
an agent translates its beliefs into an optimal action. In particular, can we find a set of rules 
which is sufficient to ensure that any action based on those rules will be optimal?
5.1 A Princip le o f Sufficiency
In this section, we develop a concept of sufficiency specifically related to the BID representation, 
and prove some technical results, showing under what conditions this form of sufficiency applies. 
When combined with some simple principles of rationality, these results provide a powerful tool 
for simplifying the structure of a game, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter.
5.1.1 Indifference
We wish to model how the beliefs and experience of an intelligent agent afTect the way in 
which it acts in a game. To start with, we will find it convenient to relax the prospective 
function notation.
From now on, we will use the term Bj(A'|Y') to denote the beliefs held by agent ir, about 
the let of action! X , given experience V. The range of Bi is now unspecified, so fl((X| ) could 
represent, for example, the set : X  6 A x ), a single number r  € S  denoting the
expectation of X , or simply a belief that X  = x.
As we have already seen, when it takes action Ai the agent x< holds only the following 
beliefs:
Ba, := Bi(Q\ Pa(A())
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that is its prospective function over the objects in the game given what it knows when taking 
an action At.
More specifically, we need to consider how the beliefs an intelligent agent has about its 
utility {Ji affect its actions. Recall the definition of the orientation graph (definition 4.9), 
part (iv):
for all a, a' € >1auiv .
o |p«(irO  =  a '|p » ( i / ,)  => Ut(a) =  Ui(a').
This is equivalent to:
for all a, a' € A auW,
o |p  t(Ui) =  o '|p « ( ( /() = >  Bi(Ui\a) = Bi(Ui\a').
In other words, indifference between two outcomes can be expressed in terms of equality of 
the prospective functions (over the agent’s utility), having conditioned on each outcome.
Now, the above deduction involved a small slight of hand. Not only do we require that the 
agent is intelligent (that it believes its experience), but also that it believes a logical consequence 
of its experience. The two are not the same; for a discussion of this philosophical point in a 
game-theoretic context, see Binmore (1987). Nevertheless, we do not intend to invoke knowledge 
of all logical consequences as a general principle; we demand only that an intelligent agent has 
beliefs which are sufficiently coherent to guarantee the above statement applies.
We can naturally extend this idea to include equality of the prospective function with respect 
to utility, conditioned on the experience of any subset of actions in the game.
D efin ition  5.1 For any subset of actions X  C A U W, x ,x '  €  A x , an agent is indifferent 
between experience x and x ' (x  ~  x ')  if
Bi(Ut\x) = Bi(U,\x').
For example, if the agent’s prospective function is represented by a iero-one possibility 
function, and if it treats uncertainty about utility within the context of a Rawlstan (minimax) 
framework, then it will be indifferent between x and *' if
inf Hi = inf Hi,U,\r U,\t<
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where Ui |- =  {u,- 6 Ui : fli(u, | ) =  1}, and Ui is the utility space of agent x,.
If the same treatment of utility is used, and the prospective function is in the form of 
a Dempster-Shafer belief function, then the condition for indifference is obtained by setting 
Ui\- =  {«j G Ui : Bel,(¿/  ^\« i|-)  < 1} in the equation above.
For the case where the prospective function is expressed in terms of upper and lower pre­
visions (denoted Pu and Pl ), and x, is utilitarian in outlook, the following conditions are 
necessary but not sufficient for indifference between x and x':
W < |» )  =  Pv(UtW)
PdU t \m)m PL(Ui\x<)
To guarantee indifference, we require that
Pu(Ui |x) =  PL(Vi\*) = PL(Ui\x') =  Pu(Ui |x'), 
which is equivalent to the condition for indifference in the Bayesian framework, namely,
E[t/<W=E[l/<l*'],
where, in all cases, the expectations are taken over the agent's posterior beliefs about all the 
unknown objects (A U W )\X  given x or x'.
Note that indifference (between outcomes) as expressed in terms of the equality of utilities 
may be considered a special case of indifference between experience. Henceforth, we shall refer 
to indifference between experience simply as ‘indifference’.
We can now prove the indifference lemma:
L iin im a 5.1 (In d iffe ren ce  L em m a) Lei At he the action taken by a sentient agent x*. Sup-
p o st
Ui l l f l  R(At )\At U T(Ai) , where R(Ai) and T(A i) partition Pn(Ai). (5.1)
Then given any acts r, r ' G A r , t G A t , <*nd a, G Ai, X| is indifferent between (r ,t,a i) and 
(r ', t ,a t).
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P ro o f:
U iU .B RHAi)\Ai\iT(A*)
jt, is indifferent between (r,<,aj) and (r',f ,a j).
QED.
5.1 .2  P re fe re n c e
In general, an agent *y may not know its own predisposition V{. It will usually have some 
imperfect observation, or estimate, on which to base its choice of actions. We call this the 
agent’s preference. Such a notion of preference is implicit in the axtom of revealed preference :
An agent’s preference can in principle be completely determined by observing its 
actions in every possible situation.
However the axiom of revealed preference is not uncontroversial, and we do not demand it as 
part of our theory.
Our definition is not based on some fixed preference ordering determined at the start of 
the game, to which role we have already assigned the predisposition function. The preferences 
of an agent are determined according to its experience, including any knowledge it may have 
about its own predisposition function. Thus the agents belonging to an individual actor may 
have different preferences. This concept of preference allows us to model the changing of an 
actor's preferences over the duration of a game as he learns about his predisposition function.
First of all, consider the special case where the experience subset of an intelligent agent ir* 
is X  = A U W, and Vt € W . Then we can define the natural preference relation over all such 
subsets x, x ' 6 A x  '■
x is preferred by to x' if and only if {/<(*) >  Ui(x').
We now extend this preference relation to proper experience subsets in the same way as 
this was done for indifference. For this we require at least a partial ordering of the marginal 
prospective function B{(Ui\X), X  C A U W , of an agent This, when combined with in­
difference between experience, according to the above definition, induces a partial preference 
ordering over experience.
01
D efinition 5.2 We say a sentient agent w,- prefers experience x to experience x' (x X x') if
Bi(Ui\x) > B,(U,|#').
A complete ordering, such as that already defined over the set X  = AU V, will not in general 
exist for proper experience subsets, and the partial preference ordering may be very limited in 
domain. In the case where beliefs are expressed in terms of a zero-one possibility function, the 
induced partial preference ordering will in general be null. There are a few exceptions such as 
when the agent uses a minimax decision rule, in respect of which it prefers x to x' if,
inf Ui > inf U%.Mil* Ui |*'
If upper and lower previsions are being used then the agent prefers x to x' if
W l l * )  > W i l * ' ) .  and 
P u m * )  > PUUiWY
This will in general produce a non-trivial partial ordering.
On the other hand, if x< is a Bayesian, a complete preference ordering can be defined 
according to expectation over the relevant conditional distribution:
x x x '  <=> E[C/,|x)>E[l/<|*'],
for all x ,x ' which are assigned positive prior probability.
Preference of experience is quite a unusual concept in the context of game theory. So let 
us pause for a while to consider what this partial preference ordering over experience really 
means. We can relate to it by considering phrases like, ‘I would have preferred it had so-and-so 
done something else,’. It is as if we were to stop the game part way through, and considered 
how well it was going for some agent. A similar concept, the ‘value of wizardry’, is discussed 
by Matheson (1990).
For the purposes of the theory which follows, we only need to compare two experiences in 
the same space A x  ■ But there is in principle no reason why we could not have,
Bi(Ut |x) > Bi(Ut\v), with Ax ¿ A y .
As with indifference, preference of one outcome over another, as defined by the first having 
a greater utility, may be considered a special case of preference of experience. From now on, 
we shall refer to preference of experience simply as ‘preference’.
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5.1.3 O ptim ality
But how do such preferences affect the actions taken? Well, suppose ir, has experience x 
immediately before taking action A,-. And suppose that for some ai,a[ £ A ,, n, prefers x U a, 
to x U aj. Then given x, we can deduce that it ought to prefer act a, to aj. Thus, a partial 
preference ordering over experience induces a similar ordering over acts.
D efinition 5.3 Suppose agent *i has experience x when taking an action A,. Then define a 
partial preference ordering over A t as follows:
For all a j,a j € -4,,
ai y  a'i <=> (xU a,)  >- (xUaJ). 
a, ~  a' «=> (xU a,)  ~  (xUaJ).
D efinition 5.4 Given experience x, define an act a* € Ai to be optimal if for all a't £ A i,
Note that, as with experience, there will only exist in general a partial preference ordering 
over A i, and hence an optimal act may not exist. Furthermore, even if an optimal act does 
exist, it may not be unique.
We can now state and prove the main technical result of this section.
T heorem  5.2 (O ptim ality  T heorem ) Let Ai be the action taken by a sentient agent Wi. 
Suppose there exist sets R(Ai) and T(A i )  satisfying condition 5.1, as given in lemma 5.1.
Let r, r ' £ A r , and t £ A t , and suppose that given experience (r, t), there exists an optimal 
act o* 6 Ai. Then a* is also optimal given experience (r',<).
Proof: Consider any act aj 6 Ai- By Lemma 5.1, Xj is indifferent between (r,l,a*) and 
( r '.f .o j) . Similarly, x< is indifferent between (r,f,a j) and (r',f,o j).
Thus we have:
(r',f,Oj) ~  (r,f,oJ)fc(r,<,aJ) ~  (r'.l.oj).
Hence a’ is an optimal act given experience (r',f).
QED.
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So we have found a rule (condition 5.1) which tells us under what cicumstances, given some 
subset of experience T , the set of optimal acts is invariant with respect t o ^ th e  remainder 
R. Moreover, since this rule is defined entirely according to the BID, we do not need to know 
the precise prospective function; in particular, the relationships between variables in the game 
including the agent’s utility are irrelevant.
As far as the agent s, is concerned, this is sufficient. Since it will always know T  =  t when 
it takes action Ai, it will be able to deduce that the set of acts available to it which are optimal 
is invariant with respect to R.
However, this is not in general true for the other agents. An agent whose experience does 
not include T  cannot make the same deduction. For this, we need to consider what rule an 
agent is using to decide its act, and whether that rule could be described as optimal.
5 .1 .4  P o lic ies
Every agent it,-, whether or not it is rational, intelligent or even sentient has to have some 
process which determines which act it chooses given any particular admission, and any beliefs 
in the case of a sentient agent. Now, we will not attempt to define every possible such process; 
the class would need to include any process which might be employed by, say, a ‘crazy’ sentient 
agent.
Instead, we consider the simplest form of process, namely a function which, given any ad­
mission, determines a single act and causes that act to be chosen. Such functions are elementary 
to every action process an agent might use. We call this function a policy.
D efin ition  5.5 A policy Si = 5i(x) € Si for the action At taken by an agent it* is a function 
which induces an act ai € Ai given any admission X  = x, X  C A. The policy space (A") = 
A x  ® b i ­
llow may policies be used by an action process? For an action taken by an agent of nature, 
in other words a variable, there are two possibilities. If the variable is determinate, then its 
distribution is defined by a single policy. If it is stochastic, then the process will involve some 
form of randomisation over several policies. A sentient agent can choose to adopt either of 
these processes, although other options are possible.
Recall that by definition, when taking action At, T( is restricted to experience Pa(/1(), so
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we can simplify this definition of a policy by specifying a* only for the cases where X  C Pa(Aj). 
For the rest of this section we assume x 6 .Ap«^,).
Note the distinction made here between a policy Si, which specifies the act At = a, to be 
chosen by an individual agent t, and a strategy, which is the term used by most game-theorists 
to describe the set of policies {5< : Jr, 6 II;} employed by a sentient actor II; for each action 
he takes in the game.
5.1.5 O p tim al policies
From the arguments and definitions above, it is easy to see how to define a partial preference 
ordering over the set of policies Si.
D efinition  5.6 We say that agent *( is indifferent between policies Si and Si (Si ~  Si) if
Si(x) ~  S|(x)
fo r  every x 6 A x  ■
We say that jr< prefers policy Si to policy SI (Si > S'J if
S i ( x ) t S i ( x )
fo r  every x 6 A x ,  and there exists an x € A x  *«cA that,
St(x) y  Sj(x).
We say a policy S ' is optimal if for all S,' €  Si,
X t s i .
So, for example, a minimax optimal policy S ( , with the prospective function defined in 
terms of a zero-one possibility function has to satisfy:
inf Ui > inf Ui,
«,!(*.*:(•)) ~  *;(•))
for all Si 6 5, and all x. A similar result is obtained for minimax with a Dempster-Shafer belief 
function.
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S '  is optimal within the utilitarian framework if,
where the prospective function is expressed in terms of upper and lower previsions, and within 
a full Bayesian model if,
E[(/<|x,S?(x)] > E [tt|x ,S ;(x )] ,
again for all SJ and x, where all expectations are defined in the usual way.
C oro lla ry  5.3 (Sufficiency Princip le) Let A< be the action taken by a sentient agent *•;, 
and let there exist sets R(Ai)  and T(Ai)  satisfying condition 5.1.
Suppose there exists an optimal policy S f 6 Si. Then there is an optimal policy SJ 6 Si 
such that,
S Jir .O -S Jir '.f)
for all r, r ' € A r , t € A t ■
P ro o f: Choose any r  6 A r , and define the policy as follows:
S!(r’,t)  = ST(r,<) for all r ' 6 A r , t 6 A t -
Now, from definition 5.6, the act aj induced by S f(r ,t)  is optimal for all r  € A r , t € A t - And 
by theorem 5.2, a,* is also optimal given experience (r',f). In other words, as the act induced 
by SJ(r',<), a* is optimal. Hence S' is optimal.
QED.
We now have the condition we need. Since the BID is common knowledge to all sentient 
agents, they will all be in a position to deduce that the set of optimal policies available to 
the agent ir, will be invariant with respect to R whatever T  it experiences. What makes the 
sufficiency principle so powerful is that it depends only on the BID. Thus, as we will see in the 
next chapter, it can be used to make important general deductions about a game before any 
precise numerical relationships have even been specified.
There are two things to note about the above corollary. Firstly T(Ai) is known as asufficient 
set for Pa(/4j) (with respect to taking action Ai). It is not unique, and in general even a 
unique minimal sufficient set may not exist. Secondly the sufficiency principle as given above
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relates only to optimal policies. Although optimal policies may be considered desirable in 
general terms, we cannot rule out the possibility that a sentient agent may not adopt such a 
policy.
In the next chapter, we will impose uniqueness of the sufficient set as a condition for the 
BID being a ‘good’ model of the game. We will show also that the Sufficiency Principle does 
not rely on optimality, and can apply under far more general conditions.
5.2 R ationality
In the previous section, we said that a rational agent t, ought to have some partial preference 
ordering over the set of acts available to it given its experience. In other words, for a given 
action Ai, it should have a partial preference ordering over the set of policies Si-
In this section we will extend this idea of rationality. We will examine various forms of 
rationality, and the consequences of imposing rationality on one or more of the agents in a game. 
We divide rationality into two forms, which we denote rationality of belief, and rationality of 
action.
5.2.1 R a tio n a li ty  o f  b e lie f
Rationality of belief involves internal rationality (coherence of belief and avoidance of sure loss) 
and external rationality (relating beliefs to the available evidence). For now we will restrict our 
consideration of rationality of belief to what we have already discussed in the previous chapters. 
With respect to external rationality, we will require that a rational agent be intelligent. Recall 
the conditions for intelligence:
An agent is said to be intelligent if
B3 Bi(x\x, y) = 1 and 
B4 Bt(x\x‘, y) = 0 if x fi
provided every term is well defined.
Now these conditions arc not particularly strong, since they do not guarantee that the beliefs 
held in such situations reflect certainty about some event on the part of the agent. This in
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turn is due to the fact that the form of a prospective function as defined may not be capable 
of expressing such certainty. I suggest that any prospective function which is unable to express 
certainty is seriously deficient.
Therefore from now on we will assume that every prospective function Bi held by a sentient 
agent is sufficiently flexible that it can accommodate an expression of certainty for any 
X  C A x , for every subset X  C Q. I do not believe that this stipulation involves too great a loss 
in generality. In particular, every form of prospective function considered so far in this thesis 
(and I expect, every type of belief ever considered in a game-theoretic context) qualifies under 
this condition.
Given this requirement, adherence to conditions B3 and B4 will guarantee that experience 
implies certainty, since 0 and 1 represent Me respectively the infimum and supremum of degree 
of belief for every prospective function, under the restricted definition which applies to those 
conditions. Note that we do not demand that every sentient agent will necessarily believe 
anything with certainty, merely that it is capable of so doing.
Intelligence relates specifically to external rationality. But what about internal rationality, 
or coherence of belief? So far we have demanded that the BID be common knowledge to all 
sentient agents. We now extend this to include, explicitly, common knowledge of every logical 
consequence of that BID, namely the set of c.i. statements which may be deduced from that 
BID using the axioms C1-C3, or equivalently the d-separation theorem. Thus any beliefs held 
by a sentient agent must be consistent with these c.i. statements.
These are the only coherence conditions which we demand. Any other form of coherence 
will manifest itself in the form of the particular type of prospective function an agent has; for 
example, a Bayesian prospective function demands very strict coherence conditions.
Finally, we consider the possibility that beliefs could be linked to utility in some rational 
way. The classic example of this is Pascal's wager, as discussed by Savage (1054) for instance, 
in which it is postulated that it may be rational to believe in God due to consideration of the 
possible outcomes given belief and non-belief. While there are many ways of countering this 
argument, I reject it simply on the grounds that an agent cannot choose its own beliefs. For 
an extended discussion on rationality of belief, see for instance Wallcy (1991).
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5.2.2 R a tio n a lity  o f action
Given that our model is based primarily on the actions taken by agents, and that the prospective 
function defines beliefs about those actions, it seems that rationality of action will prove to be 
more fundamental to our argument than rationality of belief. Therefore we will treat the two 
topics differently. We will consider rationality of action in far greater detail. In addition, 
whereas we simply assume the conditions required for rationality of belief, the conditions for 
rationality of action will form the basis of our definition of rationality itself; in other words, 
our definition of rationality will be defined in terms of behaviour.
Informally, we will require that a rational agent ir, satisfies the following criteria:
(i) If a set of optimal policies {5* } C Si exists, it should employ one of them.
(ii) The partial preference ordering over Si should be rich enough to accommodate such an 
optimal policy set.
As we have already seen in chapter 2, there is no agreed definition of rationality in the game- 
theoretic context. And the form of rationality chosen is very often related to the particular 
solution concept under investigation rather than any higher ideal.
I am of the opinion that there should be a fundamental definition of rationality applicable 
to every type of game. Any further behavioural attributes should not be defined according to 
some code of ‘rationality’. Instead they will be determined by the personality of the agent, and 
the situation in which it finds itself, that is by its experience. Note that we do not implicitly 
restrict every agent to rational behaviour; rationality of action should be considered a norm for 
the agent in question, without asuming that any other agent will necessarily conform to it.
Our definition of rationality is inclusive, rather than exclusive. In other words, we aim 
to include only those attributes which are both applicable to all games and relevant to our 
approach. Therefore it should not be seen as a definitive list, any attempt at which 1 believe 
to be futile, but as a small part of a much wider picture.
So how do our two criteria fit the bill? Well, the first criterion seems to be the obvious 
starting point; in some form or other it is included either explicitly or implicitly in just about 
every version of rationality. I would argue (and it seems most would agree) that this criterion 
is necessary for any meaningful definition of rationality. Indeed, if we accept the axiom of
69
revealed preference, which implies that when acting, an agent does whatever it thinks is best 
at the time, it may be considered a tautology.
The second is perhaps less obvious. It requires that the agent can compare every policy 
available to it with some ‘best’ policy in order to  confirm that the policy in question is indeed 
optimal. And with policy spaces being infinite in many cases, why should we expect an agent 
to be capable of this? Nevertheless we will require this condition to hold, since otherwise how 
is an agent to choose between policies?
We do not specify, however, to what extent this partial ordering is determined scientifically 
(that is through calculation). A rational agent is still permitted to use judgement and guess­
work in formulating optimal policy — indeed this would be the case in virtually all 'real-life' 
situations. In practice, if after reflection an agent is unable to rank two or more candidates 
for optimal policies, then they must be so nearly equally desirable that little could be lost by 
setting them as equivalent within the partial preference ordering.
D efinition 5.7 Call an agent it; rational if tt employs an optimal policy 5," 6 <Sj.
5.2.3 C hoosing betw een optim al policies
However, we still have a problem. In general there may be many equally attractive policies to 
choose from. We may assume either that such policies are transparently equally preferable, or 
that no amount of deliberation on the part of the agent can separate them. Therefore according 
to the above definition, a rational agent must satisfy an additional criterion:
(iii) The agent should have some way of choosing between several optimal policies.
This is not so much concerned with rationality as with being decisive; if an agent has no way 
of choosing between optimal policies, nothing happens — and that contradicts the definition of a 
game. Rationality has traditionally had a lot to say about making well-considered judgements, 
and not making over-hasty decisions. In contrast, this criterion can be summed up by the 
phrase:
‘thinking is all very well, but eventually you must do something'.
However, this piece of advice does not help very much, unless we have some method by which 
a rational agent can choose between two or more equally good options. Various solutions have
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been proposed, all of which have problems. The choice could be arbitrary, since by definition 
it doesn’t m atter which is chosen, but that avoids the question instead of answering it.
The choice could be made by some random mechanism within the agent’s thought processes, 
that is by using a mixed strategy, although it is not clear whether it is possible for the human 
brain to perform this sort of meta-rational mental convolution. Or there could be an explicit 
random process, such as tossing a coin, to determine which act to choose, but some (eg. Howard 
1971) see this as ‘irrational’. Moreover, if a random mechanism (either internal or external) is 
to be used, it is still left to determine what distribution to employ, and we are back to square 
one.
We do not pretend to be able to resolve this question completely. Nevertheless, we can offer 
a partial solution which at least goes some way towards reducing the available options, via a 
principle of parsimony.
5.3 Parsim ony
In this section, we will consider the role of information in a game. Our use of the term 
information will refer both to the admission, knowledge and experience of agents in a game and 
to the related concept of how we model that game.
5.3.1 R e le v a n t in fo rm a tio n  a n d  m o d e llin g  a ssu m p tio n s
Consider the action At to be taken by the sentient agent In principle, any experience x, has 
when taking A< will be in Pa(A,), even if this information has no bearing on the game. Of 
course, such irrelevant information should not be included in the model in the first place. Hut 
there are two questions which arise:
Firstly, who is to say what is relevant and what is not? So far we have laid down no 
conditions on this aspect of the game. Therefore as things stand, it is up to the individual 
agent to decide. However, we require a common interpretation of the game by all agents, ns 
expressed in the HU), since what an agent chooses to take into account when taking an action 
will typically depend on what it believes the other agents are going to do.
And secondly, on analysing a game — for that is after all what this thesis is about — we may 
find that some action which was included in the original model, may turn out to be irrelevant
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after all. In other words, all agents in the game will act in exactly the same way (under our 
model) whether that action is included or not.
Of relevance to the first question is the concept of common knowledge which we have already 
discussed in chapter 2. To help answer the second, we now turn our attention to providing some 
inclusion criteria for the model, and for simplifying it as a result of analysis.
5.3.2 A p rin c ip le  o f  pars im ony
We require a way of distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant information. In addition, we 
will require that such a distinction be expressed in terms of the behaviour pattern of a ‘rational’ 
agent. Such an expression of rationality is clearly going to relate most closely to criterion (iii) 
above:
The agent jt< should have some way of choosing between several optimal policies.
From the sufficiency principle, we see that if an agent x< knows that some action Aj 6 Pa(Aj) 
can only ever affect its utility Ui via its own action At, then given an optimal policy g’ which 
depends partly on Aj, it can always find another optimal policy g' which does not depend 
on A j. Therefore it would seem sensible in this situation for jr, effectively to ignore Aj when 
taking action Ai. It would then be conforming to a principle of parsimony.
Parsimony relates to the simplicity of a model, often measured in a statistical context by 
the number of parameters involved. It is implicit throughout the whole of statistical modelling 
theory (see for instance McCullagh and Nelder (1983) for an example of the use of parsimony 
in this context) and scientific modelling in general. Our definition of parsimony is firmly within 
that tradition, although we emphasise a more personal aspect of it. In particular, we will show 
how it can be applied not just by a statistician trying to model a situation, but to the thought 
processes and behaviour of an individual who is being modelled.
For example, following the Bayesian paradigm, an agent ffj, having marginalised out all its 
beliefs nbout future actions, might find that its payoff was (belief) conditionally independent of 
the action Aj (6 Pa(/t()) given Ai and Pa(/4i) \  /4y. Regardless of the form of utility function 
being used by »<, its optimal act would not differ, whatever the observed value Oj.
D efinition 5.8 Suppose the policy space for an action Ai depending on experience Pa(A<) is 
Si = -4|>«i s.) ® A ,, and suppose there exist subsets R(Ai) and T (A i) satisfying condition 5.1.
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Define the sufficient policy subspace for T(A i) to be Tj = A t(a .) ® A i , with each policy 5J £ % 
specifying an act a< £ A, for every possible experience t(Ai) £ A t (a ,)-
D efinition 5.9 Call a policy 5J £ 7j at least as simple as a policy Si € Si (say 5,' C S,)  if
TiC Si.
Clearly, simplicity here may depend on the parameterisation of the game. For example, if
Pa(y4j) =  (A j , At ), and
Pa(y»J) = ^ A i + ^A k^ A i - \ A k),
then the ‘simple’ policies may differ. However, given any particular BID, simplicity is well 
defined; one policy is at least as simple as a second policy if the set of nodes representing the 
parameters of the first policy form a subset of the corresponding set of nodes for the second. 
This is an important advantage associated with the BID representation.
D efinition 5.10 Let {£,'} C{(J7i : Tj C«S,} be a set of policies for the action At between which 
the agent ir is indifferent. Then ir< is parsimonious if it does not choose a policy Si £ {S’ } 
when there is a simpler policy S{ € {Sf}.
Note that if Si 2  SI and S{ 2  Si then both may be considered candidates by a parsimonious 
agent. In section 5 we shall impose conditions on the model which prohibit this from occurring, 
whereupon the above definition simplifies to:
An agent x, is parsimonious if, given a choice between policies in {S*}, it chooses 
a policy which is at least as simple as every policy in {S*}.
5.3.3 Parsim ony in action
So why choose parsimony as a criterion for distinguishing between policies — isn’t it just 
another arbitrary way of reducing the set of equally good policies? I believe this is not the case, 
and some of the reasons why have been alluded to above.
Firstly, parsimony represents a way of simplifying our model; remember that, although we 
are trying to model the thought processes of an agent via the policy it adopts, the other agents 
in a game will observe not that policy, but the consequent act.
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D cfinition 5.11 Suppose policy S' G 7, IS at least as simple as Si € Si. Say they are equivalent 
if for all X  € -4p»(yt()>
$ ( *  |t.) =  Si(X  k ) .
Thus if two policies are equivalent, another agent will be unable to tell which policy the 
agent ir. is employing, whatever act t obtains, since that act will always be the same under 
both policies. We now show that any policy which is equivalent to an optimal policy is itself 
optimal.
P roposition  5.4 If there exists an optimal policy SJ € T% which is at least as simple as an 
optimal policy Si £ Si, then the equivalent policy to Si in % is also optimal.
Proof: Consider an optimal policy Si € St, where Si = Ai ® A x  for some X  € Pa(/1,), and 
5j(x) =  at. Suppose there is another optimal policy SJ 6 = Ai ® A y  for some Y C X . Then
setting y = x \a y < the policy S" defined by:
s j '(y )  = 0i i f y  = v,
S'i'(Y) = SUY) t t Y * v ,
is also optimal.
It follows that the policy S"' 6 7j defined by:
SJ"(X U „) = S,(X ), for all x e  .4*
is optimal.
QED.
P roposition  5.5 Conversely, for any optimal policy Tt € 7}, there is an equivalent optimal 
policy T[ G S i.
Proof: Set T l(X )  = Ti(X  |t,), and the result follows from the proof to proposition 5.4.
QED.
Hence, an agent will observe the same act made by another agent, whichever equivalent 
optimal policy it uses. So in general, it is impossible to tell from an agent’s actions whether 
or not it is parsimonious, and in fact it makes no difference to the outcome of the game.
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Therefore, for the sake of model simplicity, we should eliminate any unnecessary dependencies, 
thus enforcing parsimony in the normative sense. This is done using a process known as arc 
deletion, which we will describe in chapter 6 . The strength of this result arises from the fact that 
the prospective function of an agent incorporates all relevant information within the agent’s 
beliefs about the actions in a game.
Secondly, we might want to consider the ‘cost’ incurred by agents in remembering or thinking 
about irrelevant information. Now you may say that such costs should already have been 
included in the model. However in order to model this within the B.I.D. we need to introduce 
additional nodes representing the decisions on whether or not to consider additional pieces of 
information, and we are back to square one. And even within alternative modelling systems, 
the problem of infinite regression is encountered (that is . .. the cost of thinking about the 
cost of thinking about the cost of ...). When costs or other ‘external’ restraints are explicitly 
included in the model, we enter the realm of bounded rationality, which was briefly touched 
upon in section 2.3.2.
In similar fashion, parsimony is consistent with the aim of choosing a policy which takes 
less time to calculate; under the scheme for calculating optimal policies proposed by Binmore 
(1988), this would tend to result in a better policy being chosen.
5.3.4 Parsim ony in  p rac tice
But there is a more fundamental argument as to why parsimony should play a part in the way 
agents behave. According to the Bayesian school (see Savage, 1954), the act to be taken should 
depend only on the expected utility of that act, given the currently available information. Taken 
at face value that excludes the concept of parsimony, since we are introducing an additional 
factor into the decision-making process.
But parsimony is implicitly used in the formulation of a model, and this is true for every 
other proposed system of decision theory. Indeed, a stronger version of the parsimony principle 
(see chapter 6) underpins the scientific method itself, since without some limitation of the 
scope of a problem, model formulation is impossible. By including parsimony as an axiom, 
we are merely making explicit what is in fact common practice in the modelling of uncertain 
environments.
One objection to parsimony might be that it disallows the explicit use of ‘mixed strategies',
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since such a strategy makes use of some random mechanism, which is known only to the 
agent concerned, and is otherwise inconsequential as regards the outcome of the game. Mixed 
strategies are ubiquitous in game theory and, although their use is disputed (see for example 
Howard, 1971), their existence still underpins many game-theoretic results.
We have already dealt with this question in chapter 2; to repeat, the importance of the 
mixed strategy in game theory relates not to the fact that anyone actually uses such a device 
(and if they did, it would be impossible to detect in any case), but to the uncertainty of other 
agents about which ‘pure strategy’ is being employed.
In Chapter 6, we will demonstrate a variety of ways in which the concepts of sufficiency, 
parsimony and various forms of rationality can be used to simplify our model of a game, as 
defined by the BID.
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6 Simplifying the Model
The BID I of a game includes every factor known to an agent which could possibly influence 
its outcome. As as result it can become very large. In this chapter we will consider a variety of 
methods which may be used to simplify a BID and hence simplify the model which it represents.
The behaviour of an agent must depend not only on the extent of its own ‘rationality’ but on 
its assessment of the ‘rationality’ of all the other agents and, by extension, on its assessment of 
their assessments of the ‘rationality’ of everyone else, and so on ad infinitum. Hence common 
knowledge will play an important part in our analysis. In particular, we require common 
knowledge to simplify a game. Recall Definition 4.17:
An orientated game Ts is said to be belief-structured if its BID I is the same as its 
orientation graph 77, and 7 is common knowledge to all sentient agents.
Therefore any simplification of the game which involves altering its BID must also be com­
mon knowledge to all sentient agents, as must the reasoning upon which that simplification is 
based. Later on we will consider how a game may be simplified via a process of arc deletion. 
To begin with with, however, we will consider node reduction, which reduces the complexity of 
a model by eliminating unwanted actions or parameters.
6.1 N ode R eduction
The BID may include nodes in which we are not really interested: in other words, nodes 
representing actions which arc irrelevant to all agents, given common knowledge that all are 
parsimonious. Ilow can we tell which nodes are irrelevant and which are not, and what assump­
tions do we have to make to justify removing them from the BID? To answer this question, we 
must first consider how the BID should be drawn initially to model a game both faithfully and 
usefully.
6.1.1 S uppressing pred isposition  nodes
The first issue connected with the modelling process which requires consideration is the treat­
ment of predisposition, and in particular how it is represented in a BID. Recall that in defining 
the orientation graph, and hence the BID, we have chosen only a subset W  of the set of pre-
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dispositions V  to be represented by nodes in the graph. We must now consider what criteria 
can be applied to decide W.
Now, suppose that some predisposition Vi is common knowledge to all sentient agents, 
represented in a BID by Vi being a parent of every action taken by a sentient agent. This 
is equivalent in the usual game theory terminology to some part of the (normal form) payoff 
matrix being common knowledge, an extremely common assumption in game theory. Then 
there is no modelling requirement to include VJ in the BID, since such common knowledge can 
be incorporated in every agent’s prospective function without compromising the accuracy of 
the model.
Next, consider the opposite extreme: that no sentient agent (not even Xj itself) admits Vi, 
and that no sentient agent can infer anything about Vi from any action which it does admit. 
Such a situation might be represented by a BID in which for every sentient agent , Aj  11»  Vi 
unconditionally. In this case also we would want to omit the node Vi from the BID, since it 
could simply be incorporated in i / , .
In fact, we can generalise these cases; if every sentient agent falls into one of the two 
categories described above, then we should not include VJ in the BID. The general requirement 
if a predisposition node V) is to be omitted is that no sentient agent has access to any information 
about Vi unless it admits V). In other words, no agent can learn about V,, other than by 
observing it. We will consider the concept of learning in more detail in the next chapter.
Recall that we treat predisposition nodes as actions of nature when defining their relation­
ships to other actions in the BID. So in fact we can generalise the above analysis to include all 
actions of nature.
How can we put these principles into practice? Since we are talking essentially about how we 
ns statisticians or game theorists choose to model a game, there can be no hard and fast rules; 
it is essentially a question of good judgement (based on the scientific method). Nevertheless, 
suppose that during the process of modelling a game, a preliminary version of the BID contains 
an orphan node, that is a node with no parents, satisfying the above conditions. Then that node 
may be supressed by removing it and all connecting arcs from the BID. Successive application of 
this principle may be used to substantially reduce the size of a BID. However, such suppressions 
are to be used with extreme caution. Specifically, they must be justified in terms of the 
rationality of the ngents in a game.
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The simplifications of the BID described above are based more on practical than theoretical 
considerations. When the BID of a game is drawn, in practice we will not include absolutely 
everything which is known to the agents as a node in its own right. Instead such knowledge will 
be incorporated into the prospective function of each agent. As outlined in chapter 5, certain 
unknown objects may be deemed irrelevant to the game. Again these should not be included, 
and will not feature in any agent’s prospective function, since they make no difference to the 
set of optimal policies.
6.1.2 B arron  node reduction
The previous manipulations involving the removal of unwanted nodes are based on principles 
of statistical modelling and common sense. We now describe a further way of deleting nodes 
which is based on the BID as already specified.
D efinition 6.1 A barren node At is an action which has no descendents in I, or whose de- 
scendents are all barren. So if Ba is the set of barren nodes,
Ba =  {A; £ A : De(Aj) C Ba},
or equivalently,
Ba =  {A, € A : At An(l/)}.
Under what conditions will such actions have no effect on any of the other actions in the 
game, or on the utility of any agent?
We will argue that, as a corollary of the axiom of revealed preference, a sentient agent sy will 
disregard actions represented by barren nodes. Furthermore, provided it is common knowledge 
to all sentient agents that every such agent will behave in this way, then barren node actions 
become irrelevant to the game, and can be removed from our model.
Case 1: At & Ba, ay sentient.
Suppose that when ay takes its action At, it takes into consideration the existence in the 
game of an action Aj  € Ba in such a way as to affect its own choice of act at 6 At- Then xy is 
exhibiting a revealed preference over A j for some combination o.y € A - j  = \ A, At-
1 Thus it believes that for some aj 6 A j,
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But Aj €  Ba, contradicting the definition of the BID.
Case 2: Ai Ba, X( € Ilyv-
Ban Pa(i4j) =  0, so no action Aj 6 Ba can affect the action At.
Case 3: Ai € Ba, Xj sentient.
In this case, x, is (by definition) indifferent as to which act a,- € A  it chooses, regardless of 
anything else in the game. Therefore the action is simply redundant.
Case 4: Ai € Ba, Xj € II/v-
By definition, the action does not matter to x*.
Now recall that the BID is common knowledge among the sentient agents in x. So it is 
reasonable to suppose that the reasoning used above which is based on the BID is also common 
knowledge. Thus all agents 7tj €  x \  Xj will ignore an action Ai € Ba, and treat the game 
exactly as if Ai did not exist. If x, is sentient, it will behave in the same manner except that 
when it comes to take action Ai, it will be indifferent as to the choice of act. And if x, is an 
agent of nature, then it is merely the executor of an action which has nothing to do with the 
rest of the game.
So we are able to remove At from the game (delete it and all the arcs connected to it from 
the BID /  to form the new BID / ')  to leave an equivalent game, in the sense that no other object 
in the game is affected. In particular, an optimal policy for any agent in a game represented 
by I will also be optimal in the game represented by / ',  with the same marginal prospective 
functions {fli(X|V) : A, 6 <?, X ,Y C Q ) ,  where Q = V 'U i/U /l \B a .
T heorem  0.1 (B arren  Node R eduction  P rincip le) A barrrn node in the BID I of a belief 
structured game Fa may be deleted (along with all its connecting arcs) to form a new BID / ' 
with no effect on the set of non-barren objects Q = IV U i/ U A \  Ba.
Thin is a generalisation of a result proved by Shachter (1986) for the decision influence 
diagram. It is particularly powerful when used in conjunction with arc deletion.
0.1.3 U sing are reversal to  rem ove nodes
As has already been commented on, there is some freedom in the way in which relationships 
between a set of variables or actions of nature are modelled. So for example, we might have
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the choice of which direction an arc between two such action nodes will point. Furthermore, 
under certain conditions, we can reverse the direction of an arc within an existing BID.
This may be accomplished using the arc reversal theorem, postulated by Howard and Math- 
eson (1981) and proved by Shachter (1986) and more generally by Smith (1989b), whose version 
we give below. Pearl (1988) showed that the arc reversal theorem is a corollary of d-separation 
(theorem 3.1).
T heorem  6.2 (A rc Reversal) Let I be an ID which includes the arc (Ai ,A j ) ,  where Jr, and 
itj are both agents of nature. Define / '  to be the ID derived from 1 by:
(i)  removing the arc (A i.A j) and replacing it with (Aj,A¡);
(ii) adding the arcs {(A*, Aj) : At  € Pa(Aj) \  Pa(Aj)} and {(At ,  Aj)  : At  € Pa(Aj) \(Pa(A j) U
^ )} -
Then C (I) => C(I').
Figure 6.0. Node reduction using arc reversal
If reversing an arc in this way results in a node becoming barren, then it may be removed. 
So for example, in the ID /  shown in figure 6.0, we can reverse the arc between the two actions
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of nature X  and Y  to form the ID This leaves X  as a barren node, so it can be deleted to 
leave the ID /".
6.2 Arc D eletion
6.2.1 T he arc dele tion  theorem
At the end of section 5.1, we stated that the sufficient set T(A¡) is not in general unique. In 
fact, there may not even be a unique minimal sufficient set T(.4,) — that is such that T(Ai) 
properly contains no other subset satisfying condition 5.1 — with the result that there may 
exist two optimal policies neither of which is at least as simple as the other. However, if we 
restrict the set of belief conditional independence statements to those which can be derived 
directly from the BID, for example by using the d-separation theorem, the following lemma 
tells us that there is a unique minimal set T(A ¡) satisfying condition 5.1.
Lem m a 6.3 (E xistence and U niqueness of the; M inim al Sufficient Set) Let A, be an 
action in the game with BID I, such that the b.c.i. statements which hold are exactly those 
which may be derived directly from I using the entenon of d-separation. Then there exists a 
unique minimal set T(A¡) and a corresponding maximal set R(A¡) satisfying condition 5.1.
Proof: Suppose there exist two partitions of Pa(Aj), (fi(Ai), T(A, )) and (fi'(Aj), T'(.Aj)), with 
T(A i) *  V (A i).
Define the following subsets:
W =  R(Ai ) i jK ( A i )%
X  =  7’(A ,)nft'(A ,). 
y  = R(A() n r ( A t ),
Z • A i U (T {A t ) r \ r ( A , ) ) .
So {W, X ,Y , Z ) partition A<UPa(.4<).
Now, we recall the proof of the d-separation theorem (theorem 3.1), and form the graph J, 
which is the undirected, moralised subgraph of Ui U Ai U An((/< U A,), in the same way. Given 
the premise, the following must hold:
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(i) all undirected paths in J between a node A 6 (W U X) and i/, must pass through a node 
B  €  ( Y U Z ) ,  and
(ii) all undirected paths in J between a node C  € (W U Y)  and Ui must pass through a node 
D e ( X U Z ) .
Together, these imply:
all undirected paths in J between a node E € ( W  U X U J')  and Ui must pass through a node
F e z .
Hence, putting
r '(A i)  - 7 X 4 ) n r ( 4 ) ,
K '(A i) = R ( A i ) U/ f ( A t ),
we have:
Ut H B R"(A<)IAiUr'(Ai) ,
which contradicts our original assumption.
QED.
We can now prove the Arc Deletion Theorem:
T heorem  6.4 (A rc D eletion) Let T.* be a belief-structured game with BID I , and let € n 
be a sentient agent in Tyi. / /  wi is intelligent, rational and parsimonious, and this is common 
knowledge among the sentient agents, then the BID V , which is constructed from I by deleting 
the set of arcs { (Aj , Ai) : Aj € does not imply any false belief conditional indepen­
dence statements, where R(Ai)  is any subset of the unique maximal set of actions satisfying 
condition 5.1.
Proof: Define the following two policy spaces:
Si = Ap»(s,) ®
Ti = < 4 r(4 ,)® ^o
Hy corollary 5.3, if an optimal policy Si 6 S, exists (guaranteed by rationality of x<), then there 
is an optimal policy SJ 6 Si such that
5j(r.O = Sj(r',<)
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for all r, r' 6 A r , t 6  A t -
Let Ti € T, be the equivalent policy to Si € S i . Since the optimal policy S't can be embedded 
in the policy subspace 7i then, by proposition 5.4, 7) is optimal. Similarly, for every optimal 
policy available to »¡, the equivalent policy in 7) is optimal.
Now, since *•* is parsimonious, it will employ an optimal policy 7) 6 Ti which, given the suf­
ficient set T(At) ,  does not depend on the set R(Ai).  Because this is common knowledge among 
the sentient agents, we can derive the following belief conditional independence statement:
A i± L B R(Ai)\T(Ai)  .
As defined above, the BID / '  implies the same b.c.i, statements as does /, together with 
the above b.c.i. statement and their joint corollaries.
QED.
This is a generalisation of “reduction by sufficiency principle” , as given in Smith (1989a). 
G.2.2 U sing arc deletion
The deletion of an arc in the BID of a game T* is equivalent to an extension of the set of 
b.c.i. statements which apply to that game. By considering Theorem 6.4 in this way, we can 
summarise it by the following corollary.
C oro llary  6.5 (A rc D eletion R ule) Let 1 be the BID for a game, and let it be common 
knowledge among the sentient agents that is intelligent, rational and parsimonious. Then, 
for Aj  6  Pa(Aj).
U iU . B Aj \AiU(Ved ,Ai ) \A j )  ==» Ai IL r Aj  | Pa(A<) \  Aj .
P roof: Let Ut J_La Aj\Ai U (Pa(A() \  Aj) . Then Aj € R(Ai), according to condition 5.1. 
Now, by theorem 6.4, deleting the arc (Aj ,  Ai) from any BID where the above condition holds 
docs not create any false b.c.i. statements.
Hence A, ! 1 b Aj | Pa(A<) \  Aj , by definition 4.16.
QED.
For example, recall the orientation graph Hi in figure 4.2. We label the corresponding 
BID /), shown in figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1. Arc deletion and barren node reduction in a BID
85
We assume that both sentient agents A3 and A3 are intelligent, rational and parsimonious, 
and this fact is also common knowledge to both. Then we can derive the following b.c.i. state­
ment from I\ using d-separation:
i/s-U-BAilAs, Aj  .
Therefore, by theorem 6.4 we can delete the arc (Aj, A3) from /  to give the BID /¡.
Now, from I\ we can deduce that
£/2_LLb Ai |A2 .
So we can now delete the arc (A i ,A 2) to form the BID /{'.
Finally, from /{', we note that A\  has become a barren node (in this case separated from 
the rest of the BID), so we may remove it formally using theorem 6.1 to leave the BID /{".
Now consider the alternative representation of the same game as given by the orientation 
graph H2 in figure 4.2 and the corresponding BID in figure 6.2
Figure 6.2. How arc deletion can be restricted by incomplete information
As before, we can delete the arc (Aj, As) to form i, by noticing that
Ua-U-B Ai\Aa, Aj,Va .
However, in this case, we cannot delete the arc (A \ ,A 3).
The asymmetry here is due to the fact that »-3 knows Ai,  and so has no need to learn 
anything more about x j’s predisposition Vj through A\. In contrast, x2 does need to take into 
account A \ t due to the path of influence (Ai,V», Aa,Uy). This example also illustrates how 
incomplete information (as represented in /j)  can affect the qualitative nature of a game.
6.2.3 U niqueness of th e  process
We have shown how to derive additional b.c.i. statements, based only on a sentient agent being 
parsimonious, and thus how to delete arcs in the BID. This process can be successively used on 
the parent set of every action taken by a parsimonious, sentient agent to further simplify the 
diagram. (More extensive examples of this are given later in this chapter.) But one question 
remains. Does it matter in which order the deletions are performed? If the answer is yes then 
we have a problem, for there will in general be no unique way of reducing the diagram. The 
following proposition shows that this is not the case.
P roposition  6.6 Given a set 0/ parsimonious agents irp C 1T, there is a unique minimal BID I' 
which is obtained by simplifying the BID I using arc deletion as defined above.
Proof: Given any BID J there is a unique set of b.c.i. statements C(J)  which can be derived 
directly from J (using d-separation). Deleting the arc aji =  (Aj,Ai)  from J  to form a new 
BID J' is equivalent to adding the b.c.i. statement aji = /l, 11« Aj | l’a(/L) \  Aj  and the joint 
corollaries of C(J)  and d (deduced by using the b.c.i. axioms C1-C3) to C(J)  to form C(J'). 
Thus we need to show that there is a unique maximal set of b.c.i. statements C(I')  which can 
be derived from C(I) using C1-C3 and the arc deletion rule.
Let C (/i) and C (/2) be two maximal sets of b.c.i. statements. Now,
C ( /)S C ( / ,)
and
C (/) = >  C ( h ) ,
therefore
C (/,)  = >  C ( / , ) := C ( / ,) U C ( / ,) .
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But C(l\)  is maximal, so C (/i) = C(/s). Similarly, C(Ij) =  C (I3 ). Hence they are equal.
QED.
One of the most attractive features of arc deletion using the sufficiency principle is that it 
only makes use of the BID. I believe such simplicity is a desirable attribute of any methodology. 
Nevertheless, in practice it is possible to weaken this condition. For the theory to work, we 
only require the existence of a unique minimal reduction of the BID. It may happen that the 
introduction of some external information allows for additional simplification without violating 
this condition. Therefore such a case does not represent any sort of a problem, and can be 
dealt with in exactly the same way as a simplification based purely on the BID.
6.2.4 G ood rep resen ta tion  of a gam e
In order to make arc deletion possible, we have to make important assumptions and restrictions 
which, although quite sensible, reduce the scope of our results. For instance, we require not 
only that an agent is rational in the sense of always choosing an optimal policy (the standard 
normative assumption for a single individual) but that other agents agree about this rationality. 
We have also artificially restricted our set of valid b.c.i. statements to those which can be derived 
directly from the BID.
The question of optimality is dealt with in the next section, where we show that a much 
weaker condition suffices to allow arc deletion. As for the restriction on the set of b.c.i. state­
ments, it is true that there are sets of b.c.i. statements which can not all be represented by a 
single BID (see for example Smith, 1990). However, it has been argued, for example by Pearl 
and Verma (1987), that such sets are in some way unnatural, and do not tend to occur in ‘real 
world’ situations.
In addition, even if some b.c.i. statements are not represented, we can still obtain a valid 
set of results by resticting our attention to those which are; it may turn out that following a 
sequence of simplifications, it may be possible to incorporate some b.c.i. statements which were 
previously left out. And on a practical note, the d-separation theorem has only been proved 
for a set of b.c.i. statements which can be represented in a BID, so the fact that some are not 
represented may not reduce the number of deductions and simplifications we can make.
To illustrate what might happen, let us consider a case where there is an additional b.c.i. state­
ment not implied by the diagram.
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Figure 6.3. The BID of a poorly-modelled game
Clearly in figure 6.3, C(I) — 0. Now suppose the action and utility spares are:
U3 = Ai = {0,1} for all i,
with Ai = A3, and
U3 =  +  | ( ^ i  +  j4j ) )  (m o d  2 ) .
Then give any distribution satisfying the above constraints, we can derive the following two 
b.c.i. statements:
U3±LgAi\At,A3  ;
U3 li-n Aj\Ai, A3 .
The arc deletion rule now gives:
^3 -l-Lfl A\ \As ;
A s lL g  At\Ai ,
But there is no unique reduction, so the graph cannot be simplified.
So what has gone wrong? Although /  is not a false model of the game, it is a poor one 
because it puts in two nodes (A| and At)  where one will do. Note that of the two b.c.i. state­
ments implied by the actual distribution, one but not both could be represented in the BID. I
69
\
\
would guess that most examples in which we have a set of b.c.i. statements which cannot be 
included in a single BID represent a poor model of a game, similar to the example above; thus 
restricting ourselves to the BID may be a positive move, in the sense that it rules out a large 
class of ‘poor’ models.
6.3 E xtensions
In this section we will look at some ways of extending the principle of arc deletion, by varying 
the extent to which agents can be described as rational. There are two directions in which we 
can go. By strengthening the rationality conditions to include a concept of joint or mutual 
rationality we can perform further deletions in a BID. But first we consider a weakening of the 
rationality conditions, namely dropping the assumption of optimality.
0.3.1 D ropp ing  the  op tim ality  assum ption
Suppose we require that every agent is parsimonious, in other words that parsimony is accepted 
as an axiom. We believe such an axiom is not unreasonable, given the arguments set out in 
chapter 5. However the consequences of this are quite profound. It means that the simplification 
of the BID is based solely on the graph itself, without any reference to ‘external’ factors, such 
as the distribution of random objects associated with the game.
Now, in the influence diagram literature, many methods of simplifying an ID have been 
developed. (For an extensive list see Smith, 1988.) Arc deletion via sufficiency is one of the 
few which rely exclusively on the graph.
If we follow the above line of reasoning to its natural conclusion, we sec that optimality is 
not necessary for arc deletion to take place. This may sound counter-intuitive, hut recall that 
the graph is defined according to the b.c.i. property, which corresponds not to optimality, but 
to indifference on the part of the agent. To see how this works, we need only to prove the 
sufficiency principle without the assumption of optimality.
T heorem  0.7 (G eneralised  Sufficiency Princip le) Let At be the action taken by a sen­
tient agent ir;, and let there exist sets R(Ai) and T(Ai) satisfying condition 5.1.
Suppose there exists a policy Si € Si. Then there is a policy SJ € Si, with Si ~  Si, such
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that.
5î(r,<) = SÎÎp' . î)
for all r, r' € .4«, t 6 A t -
Proof: The only point at which optimality is required for the Sufficiency Principle is in the 
proof of theorem 5.2. Now suppose some act a* 6 A, is not optimal given experience (r,t) 
under our original partial preference ordering V(r, t). Then define a new partial preference 
ordering Q(r,t) which is a function of V  such that:
(i) at ~ q a' <=>• a, ~ r  aj for all dj.aj 6 A,
(») a* aj for all a| G Ai-
Under Q, there is no change in the set C(l)  of b.c.i. statements, so condition 5.1 still holds. 
Hence the proof of theorem 5.2 follows without the assumption of optimality, and we are done.
QED.
C orollary 6.8 (G eneralised Arc D eletion) If the senttent agent is parsimonious, and 
this is common knowledge among the senttent agents, then the BID I as defined in Theorem 6 . f  
does not imply any false b.c.i. statements.
Proof: Direct from theorems 6.4 and 6.7.
QED.
6.3.2 Jo in t parsim ony
As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, an action known to several agents may be removed in 
some cases, depending on the rationality of the agents concerned. We now consider what type 
of rationality may be used to justify this.
Consider the effects of including additional dependencies in decision-making. In chapter 5, 
we noted that parsimony has no effect on the outcome of a game. Essentially this is because 
the discarded information has no direct implications for the utility, and is either unavailable to 
other agents, or (applying repeated arc deletion) is assumed to be ignored by those agents to 
which it is available.
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However, in many cases, an action which would otherwise be deemed irrelevant may be 
known to more than one agent. Using such information to determine which act to take may 
inform other agents about what the agent in question might do. This may be either beneficial, 
inconsequential, or harmful to the agent concerned.
The three examples we consider here all have a similar pattern. In each case, we have two 
sentient actors, n j ,  n», and nature IIjv, each with one agent (rri, s-j, and jr3 respectively). 
R = A3 represents the state of the weather, either ‘rain’ or ‘no rain’. Knowing R, both sentient 
agents take their actions Ai and A] simultaneously, with both payoffs U\ and Uj depending 
only on A\ and A?, that is,
C(I) = Ui l L B R \A i\JA i  for < = 1 ,2 .
la
Figure 6.4. Common knowledge of R
All three games can be represented by the same BID /, as shown in figure 6.4. Note that 
the predisposition nodes are not included in this BID This is because in each of the examples 
we consider, the utilities are represented in a normal-form matrix. Therefore the utility of 
each actor is a function of the outcome which is common knowledge to all. In other words, all
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predispositions are common knowledge, so they can be suppressed in the model, according to 
the conditions set out above.
First consider the well-documented game ‘battle of the sexes’. A husband n i and wife flj 
have to choose whether to go to a football match or to an opera, but are unable to communicate 
with each other what their choice is. The husband prefers football and the wife prefers the opera, 
but neither wants to go to an event on their own. The normal form utility matrix for this game 
is shown in figure 6.5.
n,
football opera
football (2,1) (0,0)
opera (0,0) ( 1,2)
Figure 6.5. Normal-form utilities for ‘battle of the sexes'
Clearly, if both agents decide to go for their favourite event, both will lose out. And if they 
try to anticipate the other’s action, there is still a substantial possibility that they gain nothing. 
So suppose they have previously decided that if it rains, they will go to the opera, and if it 
doesn’t they will go to the football. During the day, they both observe an identical value of ft.
Now, this information (the agreement together with the observation) has no direct bearing 
on the utilities; in this model we assume that the football is indoors. However, it clearly does 
have a bearing on what the other will do, and it can be used to the advantage of both. The 
‘solution’ described is an example of a correlated equilibrium (see for example Aumann 1974, 
1987), with H being the correlating mechanism.
Secondly, consider another well-known game, ‘paper, scissors, stone’. Two agents simul­
taneously choose either ‘paper’, ‘scissors’, or ‘stone’. Paper beats stone, stone beats scissors, 
scissors beats paper, and the same choice produces a tie. The normal form utility matrix for 
this game is shown in figure 6 .6.
Now suppose it starts to rain. Clearly, this should make no difference to the behaviour of 
the agents. However, one or both agents might for some reason choose to let their optimal
93
policy depend on whether it rained or not. Provided the other agent does not know in what 
way this difference in behaviour manifests itself, for instance if they play a one-off game, then 
no harm is done.
n3
paper scissors stone
paper ( i.i ) (0.2) (2.0)
scissors (2,0) ( 1.1) (0,2)
stone (0.2) (2,0) (1 ,1)
Figure 6.6. Normal-form utilities for ‘paper, scissors, stone’
However, suppose one agent does have some information about the other’s idiosynchrasy. 
For instance, it might decide never to choose ‘paper’ when it rains, ‘in case the paper gets wet’. 
In that case, its opponent would be given an unnecessary oportunity to gain an advantage.
Clearly such a policy makes no sense at all, and could be described as ‘irrational’. However, 
under the current definition, parsimony is insufficient to preclude such a possibility. In fact, to 
do so, we need a much stronger version of the parsimony principle, involving not only common 
knowledge of parsimony, but a common agreement on the irrelevance of information.
Although the examples above are somewhat contrived, it turns out that in real life such cases 
are the norm. In practice, there will always be seemingly irrelevant pieces of information which 
are common knowledge to some of the agents in a game. The question of deciding which are 
indeed irrelevant goes right to the heart of any attempt to devise a closed-model approximation 
to an open system, which is the essence of statistical model building. Therefore it deserves 
some comment.
How do the agents in a game jointly decide to ignore certain information? The answer is 
partly systematic or rational, and partly to do with culture or tradition. First, consider the 
thought processes of an actor playing the game, 'paper, scissors, stone’. He thinks:
‘Is there any reason why the rain should change the way I play? Not unless it affects 
my opponent. And I think she’s pretty sensible, so is unlikely to be affected. So
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I may as well assume it makes no difference, unless my experience of playing the 
game tells me otherwise. I choose to ignore the rain since it involves negligible loss 
of information.’
In other words, he applies the scientific method. And providing his opponent does the same, 
we can remove the factor of rain from our model.
As an example of the effect of culture on a game, consider the game of bridge. During a 
game, a player may recieve ‘unauthorised’ information due to a mistake by his partner. It is 
considered unethical for that player to use this information to his advantage. Therefore all 
players will make the assumption that this infomation is ignored by the player in question.
We can encompass examples such as these within our system by using the concept of joint 
parsimony.
D efin ition  6.2 Say the set of agents i ' C i  are jointly parsimonious with respect to an arc 
(Aj. At) if if is common knowledge among 7r* that x,- ignores Aj when taking A,-.
R e su lt 6.9 If ir’ =  IIs, we can delete the arc (Aj,Ai) from the BID.
6.3.3 E quilibral reductions
The above definition for joint parsimony serves merely to describe a phenomenon: namely that 
an agent chooses to ignore some action for which it knows the value. It does not address the 
question ns to why it acts in this way; in particular we might ask whether it is ‘rational’ for it 
to do so. Now we have already seen that such joint parsimony is justified given the conditions 
required for the sufliciency principle. Are there any other circumstances in which it would be 
reasonable to expect a ‘rational’ agent or agents to disregard previous actions in this way?
Smith and Allard (1992) employ an equilibrium-based argument to derive a principle known 
as equilibral rationality. Let /  be the BID of the belief structured game Ts- Let A be a subset 
of the set of actions taken by sentient agents. For each At 6 A,let R'(At)  be a subset of Pa(A|). 
Now let I '  be the BID obtained from /  by deleting the set of arcs {(Aj,Ai)  : A< £ X ,A j  G 
R -(A t )).
Consider the BID I' derived from /* by replacing one arc (Aj,  Ai) which has been removed 
from the BID I. If applying the arc deletion rule to l ' would result in the arc (A j,A i)  being 
deleted again, then we say that /* is a partial equilibral reduction of /  with respect to (Aj, Ai).
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D efinition  6.3 We say /* is ari equilibrai reduction of I  if il is a parimi equilibrai reduction 
wtth respect io (Aj ,A ì) for all Ai € X  and all Aj € R"(Ai).
h  ¡ 3
Figure 6.7. Reduction using equilibrai rationality
Consider the BID I3 shown in figure 6.7. Clearly, if the arc (R , Ai)  were not there, then we 
could remove the arc (R, Aj)  via arc deletion, and vice-versa. Therefore removing both arcs 
gives an equilibral reduction /¿, shown in figure 6.7 with the barren node R  removed.
A more complex example is depicted in figure 6.8. The arcs (fi, A\) and (/J, Aj) may both 
be deleted from the BID /< to form an equilibral reduction / J , in which the node R has been 
removed following reversal of the arc (R,T).
Equilibral rationality requires all sentient agents simultaneously to ignore certain previous 
acts. The principle behind it is that it is parimonious (and optimal) for every agent to ignore 
certain actions provided every other agent does likewise: hence our use of the word equilibral. 
In practice it shows that in a large number of situations, the use of extended arc deletion using 
joint parsimony may be justifiable.
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Figure 6.8. Another example of reduction
Equilibral reductions are typically non-unique. Indeed, when co-operation or co-ordination 
is mutually advantageous, ns in a correlated equilibrium, then such a reduction might be termed 
(jointly) ‘irrational’. Equilibral reduction may remove from the game some information, com­
monly known by two or more players which acts as a correlating mechanism, ns in the ‘battle 
of the sexes' described above.
Vlaskin and Tirole (1989) define a Markov perfect equilibrium by assuming independence of 
all subsequent actions in the extensive form, given the actions already taken; see also Fudcnberg 
and Tirole (1991). It turns out that this corresponds to a special case of equilibral reduction, 
namely the minimal equilibral reduction / mtn. We define / mln to be the result of removing the 
maximum number of arcs possible; if the arc deletions are restricted to those nllowed according 
to the BID, it is unique by the proof of proposition 6.6. Needless to say, Markov equilibrium is
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a not uncontroversial concept in game theory.
However, in a positive sense, the set of equilibral reductions provides us with a nested set 
of possible models or hypotheses for a game, against which we may be able to compare what 
actually happens. Any BID which is not an equilibral reduction may represent a model of a 
game which is untenable in the strong normative sense. In other words, we would not be able 
to recommend the optimal policies arising from it simultaneously to all agents (which does not 
mean to say that it can’t happen).
For example, Young and Smith (1992) consider a symmetric repeated game involving two 
actors, 111 and IIj. They show that if the actor IIj assumes that her opponent IIj is using a 
strategy (known as an n-step back strategy) based only on the latest n pairs of actions, then she 
can improve on H]’s performance by using all previous actions. Thus in the Bayesian setting 
it is proved that strategies based on the lastest n pairs of moves cannot form an equilibral 
reduction.
6.4 An Exam ple
To end this chapter, we will look at an example of how a game can be modelled and simplified 
using the BID methodology we have developed. We use a game adapted from Parthasarathy 
and Raghavan (1971).
6.4.1 A gam e sim ilar to  poker
This is a zero-sum game with two sentient actors IIi and II], and we assume that the utility of 
each actor (and hence each agent) is measured in units. Each is dealt randomly and without 
replacement one of three cards labelled 1, 2 and 3, and we denote the card dealt to actor IIj as 
Xj. However, before either actor has seen his card, Hj can choose whether or not to switch the 
two cards, in the action AJ taken by agent Xj. The card which is finally allotted to and seen 
by actor Hi is denoted Yi.
The minimum bet or ‘ante’ is 1 unit. H i’s first action A| (taken by agent x{) is either to 
‘raise’ the bet to 2 units, or to ‘pass' and leave it at 1. Then H]'s agent x’ takes A%, which 
is a choice between ‘raise’ and ‘pass’ if A\ was ‘pass', and a choice between ‘see’ and ‘fold’ if 
A j was ‘raise’. Finally, if he ‘passed’ and Ilj ‘raised’, then Hi has another action A? which is
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either to ‘see’ or ‘fold’.
If both pass, then the actor with the higher numbered card wins 1 unit. If one raises and 
the other sees, then the actor with the higher numbered card wins 2 units. If one actor folds, 
then the other wins 1 unit. By identifying ‘pass’ and ‘fold’ with the act L and ‘raise’ and ‘see’ 
with the act H, we see that each of the actions A\, Af  and A\  has the same action space
A  = {L , H }.
We define Z to be a binary response variable (action of nature), taking the value 1 ifVi > V2 
and 0 otherwise. To simplify the diagram, we denote X  to be the ordered pair (X i.X j), U to 
be the set of utilities { l / f} and V the set of predispositions V? , where
u\ =  V} =  -U\ =  -Ul
and V is common knowledge, since we assume that the utility function is common knowledge 
to both actors. We also assume perfect recall on the part of both actors.
Figure 6.9. The complete BID for the poker-like game
The complete BID is shown in figure 6.9. Although we have already simplified it by using 
the vectors X , U and V, it still contains 10 nodes and 24 directed arcs. By using all of the 
techniques for simplification developed here combined with some general principles of statistical
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modelling, and making the appropriate assumptions at each step, we see how the BID may be 
reduced to only four nodes and four arcs.
S tep  1. The first thing to note is that the predisposition vector V is common knowledge to 
all sentient agents. So it does not need to be explicitly represented in the BID, and may be 
removed along with its connecting arcs according to the arguments set out in section 6.1.1. 
S tep  2. Now suppose that each agent’s prior prospective function for X,  namely B/(X|0), is 
symmetrical with respect to each of the six possible values. Then since xj does not admit X,  
we must have F) 1Lh A\ given any subset of Pa(Aj), i , j  = 1 ,2 . Thus we may delete the arcs
( M M ) .
This results in the BID shown in figure 6.10.
Figure 6.10.
S top 3. By theorem 6.2 we can reverse the arc (X , ), and then subsequently the arc (X, Yj),
adding the arc (V'i .Yj ).
Stop 4. As a result, X  is now a barren node, so may be deleted with its connecting arcs 
according to theorem 6 .1.
S top 5. Now, suppose that xj is intelligent and parsimonious. Using d-separation (theorem 3.1) 
we may deduce the b.c.i. statement,
100
By the arc deletion rule (corollary 6.5) we have,
A]^i-B Aj \A\, A \,Yi  ,
and we may delete the arc (>4j,i4i).
S tep  6 . This gives us
U n .B A lt \A \ ,A l ,Y i  ,
so the arc deletion rule allows us to delete (y4j, A\). This in turn leads to
U1L b A\\A \,Y x ,
and the deletion of the arc
S tep  7. This leaves us with the disconnected node Aj, which is formally removed as a barren 
node, to produce the BID in figure 6.11.
Figure 6.11.
S tep  8. Recall that the action AJ is only ever taken if a | = /, and a\ = H , so if irj has to take 
A J then these two acts may be assumed. Strictly speaking, we may suppose AJ is always taken 
but that it only ever makes any difference to U when the aforementioned acts arc chosen.
Therefore by the strong independence principle, or the ‘sure thing’ principle of Savage 
(1954), it is parsimonious for nx to ignore A\ and A\,  and let its act ajf depend only on Yx. In 
other words,
A* IA-b , ^ j|T i ,
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Step 9. Now this BID represents any game with the same qualitative structure. So for example 
the numbers on the cards, instead of being restricted to 1, 2 and 3, could have any distribution. 
Suppose it is common knowledge to all sentient agents that (X i ,X j )  — and hence (V^ i, Vj) 
— are independently distributed on Si. Then we have Vj I L b Fi , and we can delete the arc 
(V't.V'j).
The BID is now reduced to the one shown in figure 6.12.
and we may delete the arcs (y4{,.4?) and (j4j ,./4J).
Figure 6.12.
Stop 10. Finally, let us consider what we can deduce if each sentient agent has a prior 
prospective function flf( |0 ) such that Vj is uninformative about Z. This would happen, for 
example, if the prior distribution was a suitable improper distribution, such as Yi ^independent 
uniform on Sf. If this is common knowledge, we have Z 11 a Vi , and so (Y t ,Z ) is deleted, for 
•  =  1, 2 .
Stop 11. Consequently Z 1Lb A{ for all i, j ,  and we may remove Z , according to the condi­
tions set down in section 6.1 .1 .
Stop 12. Noticing that U !L gY j\A j  , (Y t,A \)  can be got rid of by the arc deletion rule. 
Stop 13. Now, suppose that the arc (Vi, ;4j) wasn’t there. Then we would have U -U-b Fi |/1 J, 
and the arc (V|, A*) could be deleted. Conversely if (F |, A J) did not exist then (Vi, /!{) would 
go. This satisfies the conditions for an equilibral reduction, according to definition 6.3, nnd so
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S tep  14. The nodes Vj and Vj have become barren, so may be removed to leave the final 
simplified BID depicted in figure 6.13.
we may be able to delete both arcs simultaneously.
Figure 6.13.
6.4.2 Discussion
Of course, the above example cannot be considered a serious analysis; it is primarily an exercise, 
designed to illustrate how a BID might be simplified, given a variety of assumptions. In fact, 
we have managed to illustrate every method for simplifying a BID which was described in 
this chapter. Perhaps more importantly, we have shown how these methods can alternate 
and interact with general modelling principles and the introduction of specific distributional 
characteristics to produce some quite powerful results.
On another level, we have illustrated the enormous flexibility of the BID representation 
compared to the extensive form. The extensive form of a game allows you to vary the utilities 
and not much else. Adding or removing an action means drawing a new tree. One BID 
allows you to vary the utilities, the action spaces and sometimes the order of actions. Adding 
or removing actions is relatively easy, and the qualitative implications are straightforward to 
calculate.
By performing manipulations on a BID, we can evolve a whole family of possible game 
structures. Most importantly, we can analyse the relationships between those structure», and
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specify explicitly what sets of assumptions are necessary and/or sufficient for two structures 
to represent the same game. Also, we have illustrated the power of some of the seemingly 
obvious assumptions we made during the analysis. For anyone considering such assumptions, 
the consequences, as seen by the rapid disintegration of the BID, would soon dissuade them 
from believing them to be entirely innocuous.
And once again it is worth emphasising that none of the analysis relies on the use of specific 
distributions. Hence the inferences made will be valid for any distribution which falls within 
the equivalence class of games represented by that single BID, and of which the simplified poker 
game is but one member.
Of course, actually to solve a game — whatever that means — you have to introduce a lot 
more quantitative information. But there are still advantages in performing some preliminary 
analysis using BIDs. It facilitates the simplification of a game, prior to introducing specific dis­
tributions, resulting in economy of effort and a reduction in computation. Such considerations 
become more important when dealing with games of greater complexity. And significantly it 
informs on the structure of the data, creating a better understanding of the nature of a game.
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7 Repeated Games
7.1 M odelling F in ite R epeated  Games
While we have shown that a BID can be used to model just about any finite game, it is not 
necessarily the case that the resulting BID can usefully be simplified using only the methods 
developed in the previous chapter. In particular, in the case of a game for which the BID turns 
out to be very dense (meaning relatively many pairs of nodes have directed arcs between them), 
the initial set of deducible b.c.i. statements will be that much smaller; hence the conditions for 
simplification will not occur to any great extent, if at all.
Thus it appears that, once a certain level of complexity is reached, the BID can do little 
more than provide a graphical representation of a game. While that is a very useful first step in 
analysing a game, it may do little more than confirm just how difficult it would be to undertake 
a more comprehensive analysis.
But the BID is very useful in modelling a game with large numbers of actions, provided 
that the resulting graph is relatively sparse. With a repeated game this will often be the 
case. Furthermore, a BID representing a repeated game will exhibit repeated patterns and 
symmetries. It turns out that we can take advantage of this relatively formal graphical structure.
7.1.1 Schem atic DIDs
We recall from section 2.3.3 that a repeated game comprises a number of consecutive plays of 
a stage game, each stage game being identical; so the same actors would take actions in the 
same order, each action having the same action space as its counterpart in every other stage 
game. As in chapter 4, and for the same reasons, we restrict our attention to finite games and 
assume that the BID is common knowledge. As an illustration of a finite repeated game, The 
BID of a repeated prisoners dilemma game with T  stages is shown in figure 7.1.
As we do throughout this chapter, to simplify the appearance of the BID, a schematic 
representation is used. is the action of actor Il< at stage j ,  taken by his agent . H° 
represents the situation at the start of the game: in this case just the predispositions of the 
two actors. Hi is the situation or history immediately after stage j  has been completed, and 
includes the initial state H° and all the previous actions A\. Ut is the utility rewarded to 
actor n<, and hence to each of his agents wj.
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Although the BID is imprecise, in the sense that it has been simplified for the purposes of 
representing a repeated game, it still displays the properties normally associated with any BID. 
In particular, the (imprecise) b.c.i. statements which can be derived from it using d-separation, 
for example, are still valid.
In the game shown in figure 7.1 we have assumed complete information, so that the predis­
positions of both actors are common knowledge. We have also assumed perfect recall, so that all 
previous actions and hence the entire history is common knowledge to the agents participating 
in any given stage.
However, this need not be the case. We can use the BID to model a game of incomplete 
information without perfect recall. This is done by partitioning H>~x according to what is 
admitted by each agent participating in stage j .  Thus if there are n such agents, for each one 
we must partition H*~x according to what it knows. We then take the join of all n partitions 
to give us the appropriate partition of H* " 1 for the BID.
Since in general this would result in 2" nodes in place of each history node H> we will, for 
the sake of simplicity, confine our discussion principally to games with two actors. However, 
the generalisation to games with any finite number of actors, including multiple actions by an 
actor within a stage and actions by nature, is straightforward.
Figure 7.2 shows a generalised BID for a stage game with two sentient agents. The two 
action nodes A ' are unconnected, although this need not be the case. H*~x is partitioned 
into four subsets. A' 1-1 represents the part which is common knowledge to both agents; /¡~l 
represents ir^ ’s private information; and J ‘~x is unknown by either agent.
Note that in both these examples, will always be a complete summary of everything 
which has gone before. So it is trivially sufficient, in both the usual statistical sense and that 
of chapter 5. Thus the representation of perfect recall does not require that the parental set of 
one action is a subset of the parental sets of an actor's subsequent actions. Instead, we have 
all the information repeated between each stage. While this representation is initially used for 
convenience, it has some important consequences as we will discover later on.
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Figure 7.1 A BID Representation of a Repeated PDG
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Figure 7.2 The HID for a generalised stage game with two sentient agents
7.1.2 Learning in a R ep ea ted  Gam e
Having made the link between agents belonging to an actor, we can now consider how that 
actor learns during the course of a game. To start with we will confine our attention to the 
type of repeated game discussed above, in which an actor takes only one action in each stage. 
This provides us with a natural (chronological) ordering of his actions, and of the agents which 
take those actions.
The obvious starting point is to consider the increase in the knowledge of an actor from 
one stage to the next, as represented by the difference between what is admitted by two of his 
agents in consecutive stages. So a measure of learning by actor n< between stage t — I and 
stage t might be the difference between Pa(<4') and Pa(Mj-1 ). Hut there is no reason why we
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should restrict our definition to consecutive actions, or even to an ordered pair of actions. This 
suggests that the difference between Pa(Af) and Pa(Aj) might be used to measure learning.
So in our first example, the repeated PDG shown figure 7.1, since the complete predisposition 
(in other words the normal form) is common knowledge, learning is confined simply to which 
acts have been chosen. In the general case (as shown in figure 7.2) the learning by actor II, 
between stages j  and k might be measured by the difference between K k U I f  and K> U i j .
Such a definition can encompass games in which an actor has more than one action per 
stage. It can also relate to the forgetting of information (or negative learning) in cases where 
perfect recall is not assumed. It can also be used to describe learning in any game, whether or 
not it exhibits the structure of a repeated game.
But learning is not simply a matter of acquiring (or losing) knowledge about the values of 
certain actions. Associated with such changes in certain knowledge are changes in the beliefs 
an actor holds (through his agents) about actions the values of which are unknown. In other 
words, learning should include any change (or updating) which takes place from the prospective 
function of one agent to that of the next, conditioned on that change in knowledge.
If an agent is intelligent, then we can represent its knowledge as a subset of its prospective 
function. Therefore, for an intelligent actor — defined to be an actor all of whose agents are 
intelligent — there is a natural extension to the definition of learning outlined above.
D efin ition  7.1 Lei II, be an intelligent actor, and let A{ and Af be actions taken by the 
agents irj and wf, both belonging to Ilj. We define learning £(11;)* by actor II, to be the change 
from B Ì ( \  Pa(Aj)) to B f( l Pa(A*)), where Bf(-1) is the prospective function of agent irf.
If the actor is a Bayesian, then the prospective functions of his agents will be conditional 
probability statements, with learning occurring through the usimi procedure for updating and 
conforming to the standard coherence conditions. An actor employing Dempstcr-Shafer Belief 
functions could use Dempster's (1968) algorithm for combining evidence. And no doubt there 
are ‘sensible’ ways of updating beliefs for almost any type of prospective function.
But our definition does not require that the learning which takes place necessarily follows 
any such rule. Given that agents may act independently, even if they belong to the same actor, 
then their prospective functions may also be unrelated. Hence the learning which takes place 
■nay as a result appear haphazard to an external observer, even though each agent may be
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individually ‘rational’.
7.1.3 Locally op tim al policies
While playing in a game over a long period of time, it is often difficult to think of the maximi­
sation of some far-off utility function as a realistic goal. Instead an actor might try to maximise 
some local measure of how well he is doing in the game. The usual method for representing 
this in a repeated game is to have some payoff result from each stage, and then allow the final 
utility to be some monotone increasing function of the set of payoffs; the most common models 
involve either the sum or discounted sum of stage payoffs.
Our system of modelling uses no such implicit device. In the case of a game in which money 
is won and lost at each stage, the amount of money held at the end of any stage may be taken 
as a measure of success, but this is not true in general; in any case such a measure, even if 
it exists, may not be a particularly good one. Indeed the same applies to the payoff history 
except under very limited conditions. For an actor must take account of how gains now may 
lead to losses later on, due to the future reactions of opponents, as in the repeated PDG.
But there is an alternative local measure of success which we can employ. For any stage j, 
we have defined Hi to be the complete history of the game at the end of that stage. Therefore 
//■* would seem to be an obvious candidate. Now we recall from definition 5.2 that,
a sentient agent jrf prefers experience H> = hr to experience IP = hi'  (written as
hi y  hi') if
Bi(Ui\hi)> Bi(Ui\hi').
Thus we have a local measure of each agent’s success in a game up to any given point. 
But ran an agent use this measure as a goal on which to focus, ns an alternative to the final 
utility? There is no guarantee that an act which an agent believes will result in a preferred 
experience H is the same as an optimal act. However, if there is a certainty that a preferred 
experience will result from such an act, whatever else happens, then that act will be optimal.
D efinition 7.2 Suppose Hi can be defined as a function of the sets of actions X i and Y i . 
Then we say that a sentient agent w{ weakly prefers experience xi to xi '  locally, with respect 
to Hi (xi t „ ,  x i ')  if
H‘ \xi Uv> f c f / V ' l V
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for all y> g A r t-
In other words, one possible experience is locally preferred to another if it is, in the words 
of Savage (1954), a ‘sure thing’ that whatever else obtains, one will lead to a preferred history.
D efinition 7.3 Given experience x*, we define an act a*’ g A\ to be locally optimal with 
respect to H> if  for all a{‘ 6 A\,
H>
And we can define locally optimal strategies accordingly. While a locally optimal act may 
not always exist, if it does then it is always optimal, as the next theorem shows.
T heorem  7.1 A locally optimal act is optimal.
Proof: Suppose a*' is locally optimal with respect to //•* given experience g A\>- And let 
Y* = Pa(I V ) \(-YJ U A j). Then, assuming that all the terms used below are well-defined, we 
have
O r'U o ^ ) fc(x* U a}') for all a{' g A\
Hi
Hi |a^*Ua^Ujr’ H* |a^' U x* U y> for all y> g A y j
=> B{(Ui 1^ ‘ U x ^ U i r ' )
= >  Bf (i/i|<ij* U xi)  £Bi(Ui\a>'UxJ)
=> (a’i’ Uxi) fc(o{'U*>)
==> «(* fc“i '
hence A{‘ is optimal.
QED.
So if an agent can find a policy which is locally optimal, then that policy must also be 
optimal. It may happen in a particular game that such locally optimal policies arc easier to 
determine than (globally) optimal policies.
7.1.4 T he Local Sufficiency P rincip le
Returning to the main theme of this chapter, we now make use of the schematic BID represen­
tation to establish a further method which can be used to simplify a repeated game.
I l l
Recall that in both the examples we considered in section 7.1.1, the nodes H’ could be seen 
to separate one stage game from the next. This is shown clearly in figure 7.3, in which the set 
of actions taking place in each stage is represented by a single node A’ , and the set of utilities 
is denoted by a single node U. The BID should in this case be read as if it were a DAG, with
does not imply that H‘ 1 is common knowledge to every sentient agent participating in stage j.
Since that schematic BID can be used to represent every repeated game, these properties
the set of actions taken after H*~x and before H*.
We can now state and prove the following theorem.
TliiMirom 7.2 (Local Sufficiency P rinc ip le) Let T a be a repeated game with Markov prop- 
erttea (7.1) and (7.1). Suppose for some A\ € A> taken kg the sentient agent w\, whose utility 
is denoted by Ui, that
all the nodes representing random objects. So in particular, the directed arc from H>~x to A>
A J
Figure 7.3 A BID representing the separation of stages by history nodes
The BID shown in figure 7.3 has the following Markov properties:
(7.1)
j=o i=i+i
y ±l b u \h t u x  . (7.2)
for t = 1,2.......T -  1, X ,Y C Q .
can be said to apply generally. Furthermore we may without loss of generality denote A’ to be
Hi H-h IUA‘ )\A{ UT(A{) , (7.3)
where R(A\) andT(A{) partition Pa(Aj).
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And suppose there exists an optimal policy Sf 6 S { . Then there is an optimal policy 6 S{ 
such that
Si(r,t)  = § i(r ' , t )
for all r, r' 6 A r , t 6  A t -
Proof: By the sufficiency principle (corollary 5.3) it is sufficient to show that,
Using the c.i. axioms C2 and C3, we have:
(7.1) = »  R (Al)n .BHT\Hi UAji UT(A{) (7.4)
(7.2) = >  R(Ai)±LBUi\HT UHj UAiuT(,Ai ) (7.5)
(7.4),(7.5) = >  R(A{)U.BUi\Hi\JA>i <JT(A{) (7.6)
(7.3),(7.6) = >  . ( .)
QED.
C oro llary  7.3 I f  rl is parsimonious, and this is common knowledge among the sentient agents, 
then the arcs (R(Aj), A{) may he deleted from the BID without implying any false b.c.i. state­
ments.
Proof: Direct from Theorems 6.4 and 7.2.
QED.
The significance of this theorem is that it allows us to make deductions based only on a 
small segment of the BID, in this case relating to a single stage. In fact, provided we can find a 
set of nodes which play the same role as H i , separating part of the BID from everything which 
follows it, then we can make the same sort of deductions.
The problem with the theorem is that, as currently defined, Hi is a summary of everything 
which precedes it in the game. Therefore the set R(A{) will be empty. The solution to this 
problem is to find some sufficient subset (if possible a minimal sufficient subset) of H i, so that 
the deductions to be made from the local sufficiency principle are no longer trivial. In the sense 
we use it here, sufficiency relates specifically to the agent’s utility.
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Figure 7.4 Using the local sufficiency principle
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Consider the schematic BID shown in figure 7.4. This is drawn for the just the single 
actor II,, with the nodes R(A{) and T (A j) playing the role of H>~*. We see that the nodes p, 
and R(A,i ), for j  =  2 ,..  , , T  can be deleted as barren nodes, and that R((A-) can subsequently 
be deleted using the local sufficiency principle. While there is nothing particularly noteworthy 
about this, the next example takes the reasoning a step further.
7.2 E xam ples
We now consider two examples which illustrate the capabilities and limitations of this new local 
method of simplification.
7.2.1 A p ro o f in gam e theory  using BID s
Our first example is adapted from Smith (1988). A repeated game with T  stages is played 
between two actors, n i and Ila. In each stage j  which is played, IIx and II2 simultaneously 
take actions A\ and A!7, respectively. Each such pair of actions results in a payoff to II1 which 
is a function of a\ and <rj, known only by II1.
We assume that II1 is parsimonious. We say an actor 11, is parsimonious if, for all irj,e  II,’, 
it is common knowledge to {x* : x* £ II,} that xf is parsimonious.
Being parsimonious, 11, needs to find a strategy (a set of policies, one for each of his agents) 
such that each policy depends on some set of actions which is minimal with respect to his 
utility U\. In doing so, he must condition on his beliefs about IIj, which are represented by his 
prospective function for the actions to be taken by her agents. In our model, we will assume that 
A{ depends only on the past through the statistic r , -1. We also assume that U\ is monotone 
increasing in I l l ’s payoff, aggregated over the whole game, where Ej represents his aggregate 
payoff after the jth  stage.
The BID in figure 7.5 shows the complete structure of the game.
In this case, the role of H1 is taken by the three nodes, E ) , Ri and t j .  The simplification 
is not immediate ns it was in the last example. Instead we must go by backwards induction. 
Consider I l l ’s last action A j . Setting
T (A j)  = £ T- ' u r aT- \
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we see that condition (5.1) from lemma 5.1 is satisfied, so that provided irjf is parsimonious, 
the arc (RT~l , A j )  may be deleted using generalised arc deletion (corollary 6.8).
Now if we consider IIi’s penultimate action A j -1 , we find that the arc (RT~i , A ^~ l ) may be 
deleted via local arc deletion (corollary 7.2), making use of similar reasoning. And in general, if
agents (jrJ....... trf) are all parsimonious, then having already deleted the arcs (flJ _ l , A {)Jmt+l,
we will be able to delete the arc (/?'“ *, A\)  using local arc deletion.
Now we know that the actor II i is parsimonious, so that all his agents are parsimonious. 
Then, by induction, we can delete all arcs to produce the reduced BID shown
in figure 7.6.
Thus we have proved the following proposition.
P ro p o sitio n  7.4 Given the model of a repeated game as described above, then for any policy 
of the parsimonious actor II] at stage j ,  there exists a policy which depends on the past only 
through the statistic r$~l and his aggregated payoff , such that flj is indifferent between 
the two policies.
This is a generalisation of the theorem given by Smith (1988), who restricted the analysis to 
the case in which IIi is a Bayesian, and so aims to find an opfima/strategy through maximisation 
of expected utility. The version given above includes not only the Bayesian as a special case, 
but any other criterion for optimal behaviour, and even ‘non-optimal’ behaviour.
As with all the other analysis using BIDs, we have a result which both defines the required 
conditions more explicitly and can be easily generalised. The main qualification we have added 
to the usual Bayesian version of this result is that the actor must make the assumption that he 
will in future act in a parsimonious way, in order for the sufficiency condition to hold.
The proof used is essentially rigorous, and does not involve any algebraic equations. It 
is therefore straightforward to gereralise it to any case which fits the stated constraints. For 
example, if is any function of only I/*-1 , A\ and A{ then the result still follows. So we could 
allow Ui to be any explicit function of the set of stage payoffs, for instance a function of any 
discounted aggregate payoff.
In our final example, we incrementally develop a more complicated model, and demonstrate 
how increasing complexity eventually renders our simplification methods ineffective.
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7.2.2 M odelling a com petitive m arket
This example is adapted from Smith and Allard (1992).
Consider a market supplied by three companies, 11), II2, and II3, whose sales in month t are 
denoted by A}, A], and A3 respectively. Company Ilj is the market leader, and attempts to 
sell to every customer, n 1 supplies an ‘upmarket' brand, while II3 caters for the ‘downmarket’ 
end. There is a population (assumed to be fixed) consisting of two types of consumer, type a 
and type 6. Type a consumers choose between the products of companies II1 and IIj only, 
while type b choose between those of Ilj and II3 . This is an example of a partially-segmented 
market, as modelled using DAGs by Queen (1994).
The sales of II j’s product in month i to type a and type 6 consumers are respectively 
A j(a) and Aj(4). However, these values are never observed directly but only their sum Aj = 
A j(a) +  A j(6). A simple influence diagram for these variables for the month t is given in 
figure 7.7
For the sake of argument, we will suppose that the utility Ut of company [If  depends only 
on the actions taken after some arbitrarily chosen month, setting ( = 0 for that month.
Before every month each company can choose whether or not to pay for additional advertis­
ing to increase its sales at the expense of its competitor(s). Company II] ns market leader has 
to act early in order to preserve its competitive advantage, and so in month 1 has only its own 
sales figures A] on which to base its action A], In contrast, Hi and II3 wait to see what II3 
does before taking their own actions A| and A$. In the meantime, the monthly sales figures for 
all three companies A 0 = (A®,Aj ,A j ) are published. So both know A° as well as Aj when
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they come to choose their actions.
Discussions with I l l ’s market research director suggest that the distribution of A j(a) de­
pends on (A j, A\, A i) only, and a similar model is proposed for A j(6). Since we are working 
within a partial-segmentation model, we can assume that A J only affects the competitors’ sales 
A * and A3 via its effects on A j(a) and A j(6), and that the actions taken by II1 and II3 have 
no effect on the other’s market segment. Thus we postulate that the distributions of A} and 
A3 depend only on (A®, A*, A j(a)) and (A3 , j4j , Aj (6)) respectively.
Now suppose that Ui represents the first month’s profits for company fl,. So U, depends 
only on A * and A*. The complete BID for this game is shown in figure 7.8. The history 
node H° represents the set {A',y4,+* : t < 0}, where A ' = (A \, A 1?, A*3).
From this BID, we can deduce the b.c.i. relation,
l / ,± i .* A i , l /0M l,A ?lAJ0,i4} .
Therefore the arcs (A j.A j) and (H °,A \)  may be deleted if it is common knowledge that n i is 
parsimonious. Similarly the arcs (A®, ^ 3) and (H °,A 3) may be deleted.
But now consider what happens when we move the time horizon forward by just one month. 
The utility Ui of each company is now a function of the four actions (A}, A*, A /, A /). The 
complete BID for the two-stage game is shown in figure 7.9.
For the agents participating in the final stage (stage 2), we can make similar deductions to 
those made for the one-stage version. We have
U t n - B X l l A l X l .X i . A l H 1 .
So the arc (A s./tJ) — and by similar reasoning the arc (A /, .A3) — may be deleted.
In this case the arcs ( H X, AJ) and (H X,A \)  cannot be deleted as the BID stands. However 
we may choose to replace them with the arcs (A \,A \)  and (A3 , A3 ), since for actors Hi and ns, 
their previous action is a sufficient statistic for the game's history with respect to their utility.
But when it comes to considering simplificaions in stage 1, a different picture emerges. The 
b.c.i relation
U\ -U-fl X 3, H°\A\, X ° , X$, A j
%
is no longer true (in general).
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To see why, notice that in figure 7.9, there is now a path from X j to U\ which does not pass 
through the set A\ U Pa(>4|), which was not the case in the 1-stage game shown in figure 7.8. 
For example, consider the path (X$, A^, X,'(6), X}, A%, X j(a), X f ,  V\). From here, we see that 
the action taken by company II3 in stage 1 can have an effect on the sales of company II x in 
stage 2 via the reaction by company IIj in stage 2 to the results of Pi3's first action. Hence 
due to this ‘second-order’ effect, Pii can no longer afford to ignore the sales figures X3 of 
company II3, even though they are not directly competing with each other.
Similarly, we can not immediately delete the arcs (//° , A{) and (H°,A^). However, if the 
required conditions hold, those two arcs may be removed using equilibral rationality or some 
other form of joint parsimony.
Thus we are prevented from deducing very many simplifications directly from the BID due 
to the sheer complexity of the game. As we can see from figure 7.9, the BID is more dense (it 
has a larger number of connected node pairs) than any we have considered so far. However, 
the model is still potentially very useful. In a real-life situation, it is possible that some of the 
arcs may be absent or may represent very weak dependencies. These can be tested using data, 
as can the resulting simplifications. It is this aspect of modelling which we consider in the last 
section.
7.3 Q u alita tive  H ypothesis Testing
Consider the market game represented by the BID in figure 7.8 from the point of view of an 
individual who is outside the market, but who has some interest in it, for instance a market 
regulator, or a consumer. (Although consumers as a whole can influence the market, we presume 
that an individual cannot, so is not properly an actor in our model.) He will only know those 
variables which are in the public domain, namely the sales figures, (X0, ^ 1). Nevertheless, if 
we assume that the BID is objectively accurate and that H| is parsimonious,he can immediately 
deduce from our qualitative model the following relation on those variables,
which wns not previously apparent. An analogous argument based on parsimony by II3 gives,
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To take things a little further, a company could measure or estimate most of the variables 
in the model (using market research), and compare the historic data with the above model. 
Typically, additional conditional independence statements might be inferred from the data. 
(For a practical example of this process, see Wermuth and Lauritzen, 1990.)
If the same analysis can be done by all three companies (for example if the relevant historic 
data was in the public domain), then such c.i. relations might be assumed to be common 
knowledge, and so could be represented by deleting the appropriate arcs form the BID. We 
might then find that the model could be simplified again, just by re-applying the sufficiency 
principle.
It is worth noting that in practice this will often not be the case, since a company’s internal 
decisions are generally kept secret from its competitors. However, the inferences to be drawn 
based on any assumption can be tested against the data, and can throw some light on whether 
that assumption may be valid.
Suppose, for example, that we wish to test the hypothesis that the only effect of additional 
advertising is to induce consumers to switch brands, and that it has no effect on the overall 
size of the market. This would be represented in the BID in figure 7.9 by the deletion of 
the arcs { (/! ',X{) : i =  1,3). From the BID, we can immediately see that (in the case of 
company Hj) we need to verify the statement,
X illM ilX j-'.X K a) .
Since A'^fa) is not observable, we would have to estimate it for each month t, for example 
through market research; once we start having to estimate such quantities, any deductions 
which result are no longer logical, but have some degree of uncertainty attached. Thus one 
conclusion which can be drawn is that to determine the effect of advertising in a partially 
segmented market would require additional quantitative assumptions about the relationships 
between variables in that market.
Alternatively, suppose that company Hi claims that it does know quite a lot about the 
market: that the number of type a consumers is a commonly known constant a, and that they 
have no brand loyalty. Using the 1-stage model of figure 7.8, this analysis would suggest the 
deletion of the arcs ( A f “ , X{) and ( A f J , A f j ( a ) ) .
As a consequence, we may deduce that Hi can ignore both Af? and AfJ when taking ac-
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tion A}. We might ask whether the company is really prepared to ignore its previous month’s 
sales figures, and those of its competitor, when deciding the advertising policy. If II i allows its 
action to be affected by those figures, then we must deduce that either the company is behaving 
irrationally or it does not really believe the stated assumptions about the type a consumers.
If, however, IIi does ignore those sales figures then, since we have already shown that H° 
and X!j can be ignored, the only action in the BID it uses to help decide A\ is the action Aj 
of its competitor. Now suppose that company II3 is able to make similar assumptions about 
its potential customers of type 6. This leaves us with the BID shown in figure 7.10.
Using the sufficiency principle, we can now delete the arcs (H ° , Aj) and (X j, Aj) to give us 
the result,
X'lLpX0 .
Whether or not the various assumptions made above are sensible is not the point. What 
we have shown is that the BID provides an excellent framework against which to test many 
qualitative assumptions and hypotheses. And we need not restrict such hypothesis testing 
to consideration of data. We can take into account the nature of decision making within a 
company or by an individual actor.
But most importantly, the BID allows us to deduce the consequences of any hypothesis 
relatively easily and to test those consequences against the data as well. To see the advantage 
a BID provides for this type of analysis we need only look back to figure 7.9. While the BID is 
quite large, it is easy to isolate the dependencies which relate to an individual node.
Thus we can see that a practical application for BIDs is the building and evaluation of 
models of competitive markets and other similar situations. The consideration of a variety of 
BIDs might be used to assist a company in answering the following types of questions:
Is the model appropriate fo r our purposes; can we simplify it, or should we be including 
some additional factors? Are the decisions we take based on the right sort of information? 
What information should we be paying more attention to and what can we afford to ignore; is 
there some information we don’t have which is useful enough to spend more money in acquiring 
it?
What factors influence the decision making processes of our competitors; based on past 
performance, how predictable and/or rational is their behaviour? How might they react to our 
decisions, and which particular factors will they pay most attention to? And finally, is the
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model supported by historical data; can we use the BID to help derive further relationships 
between variables based on that data?
Admittedly, this sort of analysis is a lot more difficult than anything we have considered 
in this thesis. This is due to the complexity which is inherent in the model, nnd which is 
represented in a BID such as that in figure 7.S. But just consider how much more difficult this 
type of analysis would be using other forms of modelling a game. A normal form of the 2-stage
partially segmented market would be a table of figures in more than 20 dimensions. And even 
an extremely simplified extensive form might have one billion or more edges. In neither case 
would we be able to untangle even the simplest structural attributes. Using BIDs at least gives 
us a chance of doing so.
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8 Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
8.1 C onclusions
We began by observing some of the problems associated with the modelling of games using the 
extensive and normal forms. At the end of chapter 2, I made the following statement:
Given these fundamental problems with the modelling of games, and given that 
the relative primacy of the normal and extensive forms is at best undecided, we 
must surely conclude that there is room at least to consider alternative models.
Any rival to these long-established models must demonstrate an advantage in some 
of those areas in which they are deficient. One area of deficiency common to both 
is the problem of modelling anything other than the simplest of situations. One 
possible way of overcoming this deficiency is by using an influence diagram instead 
of a tree as the basis of our model. This is the approach I propose to take.
By considering the final example in chapter 7, as shown in figure 7.9, we see that the BID 
is capable of modelling more complex situations than either the extensive or normal forms. 
Thus we have demonstrated that the BID may be worth considering as an alternative way of 
modelling games.
But there is much more to the BID than just a modelling system for complicated games. 
The foundations of the theory set out in chapter 4 provide for an entirely new area of application 
for the graphical model, and not simply an extension of some previous application. The BID 
allows us to model some of the most important qualitative aspects of a game, and then simplify 
them before even considering detailed quantitative features. Moreover, it provides ail excellent 
framework for understanding the nature of a game, and thus the potential for a more intelligent 
and responsive analysis.
By mnking as few assumptions as were necessary to develop the theory, and by stating 
carefully at each stage and justifying those assumptions which were made, the results are 
consequently more powerful. The generality in which the BID was constructed and simplified 
means that this theory can apply to an extremely wide class of games. Indeed, it is possible to 
construct a model of almost any finite game, although I would not claim that any such model 
would necessarily be a useful one.
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However, this thesis represents more than just a new way of modelling games; it involves a 
different approach to the theory of games itself. Given that the BID has been shown to have 
advantages over other modelling systems, we must conclude that the approach taken in this 
thesis, which led to the BID, is valid. It remains to be seen whether this approach and the BID 
modelling system will play a significant role in the future development of game theory.
8.2 Suggestions for Further Research
This thesis is primarily about foundations: the foundations of the BID; the foundations of 
rationality; the basic methods of model simplification. Hence there are many potentially fasci­
nating areas of investigation which arise from the work done here, but are inevitably beyond 
the scope of this thesis. A few of these are listed here; doubtless there are many others.
1. Adapt the theory to encompass infinite games.
Throughout this thesis, we have restricted our consideration to finite games. As was noted 
in chapter 4, the division between finite and infinite is perhaps the most substantial in 
qualitative terms; since the extension of our theory to infinite games is non-trivial, there 
has not been time to persue that line within the research for this thesis.
Nevertheless, I can see no reason why in principle that extension could not be made. And 
the theory set out in chapter 7 presents some clues as to how this might be achieved, at 
least in the case of infinite repeated games. If it can be shown that a preference ordering 
exists with respect to experience in an infinite repeated game, then we need only consider 
locally optimal policies. Thus the infinite time horizon would not prevent an agent from 
determining some optimal policy in any given stage.
However, there are some technical problems. For example, most of the proofs contained in 
this thesis rely in some way on the BID under consideration being finite. Thus to build 
a sound theory of infinite games, any adaptation of the current theory would very likely 
require some work on the foundational framework, and a fresh set of assumptions.
2. Weaken the common knowledge conditions which apply to the BID
If there is no common knowledge BID, then given the current theory, all we can do is to 
use the joint BID (including every arc which appears in any individual agent's BID), and
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then only provided all agents agree on which set of nodes represents the set of objects in the 
game. It may, however, be possible to weaken this condition, and still obtain some useful 
results. For example, it might be interesting to consider what deductions could be made 
based on some subset of agents (possibly all those belonging to one or more actors) having 
some common knowledge BID.
Several problems would have to be solved in order to accomplish this. For instance, suppose 
two agents do not agree on a single BID representing a game. Even if we restrict our atten­
tion to the part of the BID on which they do agree, it is not clear that the simplifications of 
chapter 6 can be made with respect to that part without making some additional assump­
tions about the extent to which each agent acknowledges the disagreement. Furthermore, 
if this disagreement is in some way quantifiable, then Aumann’s (1976) result may have 
implications as to whether the two agents could agree on the extent of their disagreement.
3. Combine the BID with the extensive form.
One attempt to combine the influence diagram with the decision tree is the contingent 
influence diagram of Fung and Shachter (1990). The analogues of these in game theory 
are the BID and extensive form respectively. It should be possible to combine these in a 
similar way. Such a framework would ideally maintain some of the advantages of both forms: 
the ability of the BID to model the conditional independence structure of a game, and the 
relative efficiency of the extensive form in representing asymmetric structures.
Our concept of sufficiency as it relates to the BID is perhaps most closely related to the 
concept of dominance which may be applied to simplify the extensive or normal forms. 
It follows that the repeated simplification of a BID based on sufficiency considerations is 
related to the iterated dominance or rationalisable principle advocated by Bernheim (1984) 
and Pearce (1984). Thus it may be possible to devise a system of alternating between the 
two methods to produce more substantial simplifications of a game than could be achieved 
by either method individually.
Needless to say, such a development would require a new foundational framework, which is 
well beyond the scope of this thesis.
4. Use the methodology to help analyse a practical problem.
Queen (1994) has used DAGs to represent a competitive market, taking into consideration 
real data when designing the model. Such analysis can help a company to evaluate the 
market situation. By using the theory developed in this thesis, it ought to be possible to 
extend this analysis to include the decisions taken by the companies themselves.
As was suggested at the end of chapter 7, there are many ways in which the use of BIDs might 
help a company to improve its decision making processes, and hence (hopefully) the quality 
of its decisions. The analysis of historic data in a market using the BID methodology may 
throw some light on whether a company’s perceptions of the way in which other companies 
make decisions accurately reflect the true state of affairs.
While such an analysis would undoubtedly be extremely hard to undertake, any results could 
have important implications for the strategic thinking which takes place within a company.
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